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ABSTRACT 
This paper looks at civil liability for prospectus misstatement under the Fair Trading Act 
1986 and the Securities Act 1978. The elements of each action are thoroughly discussed 
and compared. It will be shown that with the absence of defences under the Fair Trading 
Act, this cause of action is the predominant weapon of choice of plaintiffs. This paper 
seeks to address the question of whether this is justified. 
The paper ultimately decides that the Fair Trading Act should be excluded from the 
securities market. This is because of the inherent differences between investor and 
consumer protection. The former accepts risk of imperfect information and imposes 
liability where the preparation of information was without due care, while the later 
imposes liability where loss is suffered regardless of the care taken. In that way it is 
inappropriate and unjust to impose liability where all due care has been taken. 
Assuming the Fair Trading Act is excluded, it is clear that the Securities Act approach to 
disclosure will not be rendered deficient. This is because the respective approaches to 
misleading or untrue statements are very similar, if not the same. Therefore from both a 
liability and disclosure perspective the application of the Fair Trading Act should be 
excluded for the securities market. 
WORD COUNT 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, appendices, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 14, 600 words. 
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Although the [Fair Trading] Act has found widespread employment in commercial 
litigation, enough ought now to have been seen of its operation that some cautionary 
notes can appropriately be sounded. There is no question , that, in common with its 
progenitors in both Australia and North America, this statute was originally conceived 
as consumer relief measure. But the courts have allowed the statute to float like oil 
across water. The water in this case is turning out to be practically the whole spectrum 
of commercial law. There are two effects to be concerned about here: such an approach 
raises the possibility of large chunks of established commercial law being swallowed up 
and, whilst remedial flexibility is a good thing, ... remedial incoherence would be quite 
another matter. 1 
I INTRODUCTION 
While the poignant words of Hammond J sound a wammg as to the effect of the 
"cancerous"2 Fair Trading Act,3 many have heralded the Act as a simple and flexible tool 
of the Court to fashion justice,4 having an important economic and social role in New 
Zealand's legislative landscape. The attraction of allowing a plaintiff " to draw only one 
arrow from his quiver"5 and replacing the needless "comparmentalised Chinese cabinet"6 
of legal complexity in favour of a simpler, more accessible remedy is, in the view of 
Asher, for the better. 
Others disagree. 7 They argue that to allow the "less refined provisions"8 of the FrA to 
"jettison hard-earned intellectual capacity carefully evolved by judges over several 
1 Crump v Wala [1994] 2 NZLR 331,343 [Crump v Wala]. 
2 Crump v Wala above nl , 343. 
3 Hereafter referred to as the FT A. 
4 See supporting comments made by Temm Jin Duncan v Perry (13 August 1993) unrepo rted, High Court, 
Auckland , CP 2042/91 [Duncan v Perry] and the approach of the Court of Appeal in Coldsbro v Walker 
(1993] 1 NZLR 394 [Coldsbro v Walker] where the Court, in order to do justice between the parties, held 
the amount of damages under section 43(2)(d) was entirely discretionary. This view is also taken by 
Raynor Asher "The Vile Intrusion/Magnificent Intervention of the Fair Trading Act into Contracts" [1 996] 
3 NZLJ 85 [Asher]. 
5 Duncan v Perry above 114, 2042. 
6 Asher above n4, 85. 
7 
See Crump v Wala above nl and Watson v Gilbert (1992) 5 TCLR 95, 112 per Blanchard J. 
8 
Crump v Wala above nl , 335. 
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centuries"9 would circumvent established commercial law. 10 To do so, would disregard 
the warning of Lord Simmonds LC that " it is even possible that we are not wiser than our 
ancestors", 11 effectively facilitating law reform by a side wind. 12 Not surprisingly, there 
has been considerable judicial reluctance recognising this result. 
Following the controversial Australian decision of Fraser v NRMA Holdings Ltd 13 
Asher's benign tumour14 had crept into another part of the legal body. The equity market 
was infected, and soon thereafter, the futures market. 15 While these decisions can 
certainly not be regarded as the first, 16 the Government Jed Jaw reform that followed 
was. 17 
9 Crump v Wala above nl , 343. 
10 Thi would include the common law doctrines of misrepresentation (in particular the doctrines of 
inducement and materiality), acceptance, affirmation, privily of contract and the warranty/co ndition 
distinction contained in the Sales of Goods Act 1908. It would also provide an alternative remedy for 
misrepresentation under Contractual Remedies Act 1979, misleading statements under the Securities Act 
1978: Fraser v NRMA Holdings Ltd (1994) 124 ALR 548; 12 ACLC 855, affirmed by the Australian Full 
Federal Court (1995) 127 ALR 543; 13 ACLC 132 [NRMA ] , and for the to rts of dece it, fraudulent 
misrepresentation and passing off. The FTA has al o become synonymous with trade mark and copyright 
actions: Levi Strauss & Co v Kimbr Investments Ltd [1 994] 1 NZLR 332; Tot Toys Ltd v Mitchell [1 993] 1 
ZLR 325; Wineworths Group Ltd v Comite lnterprofessionel du Vin de Champagne [1992] 2 NZLR 327; 
Hogan and Another v Koala Dundee Pty Ltd (1988) 83 ALR 187. It could also be raised in the contex t of 
audito r and lawyer liability: sec Helen Anderson "Auditors Liability: ls Misleading Conduct an Alternative 
to Negligence?" (1999) 17 Comp & Sec Li 350. 
11 Chapman v Chapman (1954] AC 429, 444, quoted by Hammond Jin Crump v Wala above nl , 343 . 
12 For further comment see M Gillooly "Limiting Section 52 of the Trade Practices Act: The Side-Wind 
Argument" (1994) 24 West Aust L Rev 278 and Coo te " Remedy and Relief under the Contractual 
Remedies Act 1979 (NZ)" (1993) 6 JCL 141. 
13 NRMA above nlO. For furth er comment see Robert Langton "Material and Immater ial Omissions from a 
Prospectus: Refl ections of a Puzzled Observer on the Decision(s) in Fraser v NRMA Holdings Ltd" [ 1995 ] 
6 Aust J of Corp Law 44; Jon Webster "The NRMA Case - Implica tions for Directors" (1995) Comp & Sec 
LJ 281; Robert Baxt "The NRMA Case on Appeal - Some Interesting Observations" (1995) 3 Aust 
Business LR 216; W J Koeck "The Implica tions of the NRMA Case - ' between the Scylla o f the whole 
truth and the Charybcli s of confusion"' (1995] 3 BCLB, para 55. 
14 Asher above n4, 88. 
15 Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Nom ura Intern ational Plc ( l 997) unrepo rted, Federal 
Court of Australia, No 3045/1997. For further comment sec Tony Cira " Mislead ing and Deceptive 
Conduct in Cap ital Markets" (1 999] 5 NZBLQ 80. 
16 There have been a number of successful foreign currency loan cases in Australia. As quoted by Ci ra 
above nl5 , these include; Westpac Banking Corp v Eltron Pty Ltd (1987) 14 FCR 541; 74 ALR 45, Kullock 
v A ustralia and New Zea land Banking Group Ltd (1988) ATPR 40-861, Chiarabaglio v Westpac Banking 
Corp (1989) ATPR 40-971 and Mehta v Commonwea lth Bank of Australia (1990) ATPR 41-026. These 
cases illustrate the app li cation o f section 52 by applica nts w ho claimed that the banks had failed to properly 
advise them of the flu ctuating nature of foreign currency clcnominatecl loans and th at the clange rs o f 
borrowing in these currencies without adeq uate hedging. In Milner v Delita Pty Ltd (1985) 61 ALR 557, 
section 52 was used pecifically in relation to a prospectus that conta ined wrongful s tatement regarding 
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The report of the Corporations Law Simplification Task Force recommended that conduct 
in relation to fundraising, takeovers and other dealings in securities be governed by the 
existing securities legislation, the Corporations Law, and not by the Australian equivalent 
of the FT A, the Trade Practices Act 1974 (TPA). 18 After extensive public debate, 
including strong opposition by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(ACCC), these changes have subsequently been enacted. 19 
This paper examines whether a similar result should prevail in New Zealand. Thus in 
light of these Australian developments, and bearing the sentiment of Hammond J in mind, 
should the FTA be excluded from application to the securities market? And secondly, if 
the application of the FT A were to be excluded, would the existing securities law be 
rendered deficient? 
In order to resolve these issues Part II of this paper provides a comprehensive overview of 
the background, legislative purpose and the relevant liability provisions of the FT A. This 
Part is intended to allow the reader an insight into the role of the FT A and the specific 
problems that have arisen since its enactment. Part III investigates the issue of disclosure 
at common law, and introduces the common law concept of materiality. Part IV gives an 
overview of the Securities Act 1978 and assesses the adequacy of the existing provisions. 
In doing so, this Part will show what effect, if any, the FT A provisions have on these 
sections. Part V will consider the Australian perspective, including an overview of the 
the guava marke t. For a New Zealand example, in Jagwa r /foldings Ltd v Julian (1992) 6 NZCLC 68,040 
[Jagwar Holdings], the directors were he ld li ab le under section 9 for making mis leading representations to 
buyers o f the compan y shares. 
17 Corporatio ns Law Simplification Report Section 52 Trade Practices Act and Dealings in Securities 
(AGPS, Canberra, 1996) [Task Force Report]. 
18 More accurate ly, the provisions in Part V of the Tracie Practices Act 1974, o r the equ ivalent ITA 's in 
each State and Territory. 
19 
Sect ion 995A of the Corporate Law Econo mic Reform Program Act 1999 states that " the provisions of 
the Sta te Fair Trading Acts do not apply to dealings in securiti es" . Section 51AF of the TP/\ also exclude 
conduct in relation to financial services from the applica ti o n of sect io n 52. Financial serv ices arc cl cfi nccl 
by the Australian Securities and Invest ment Commission Act 1989 sect ion 12BA and_ has the effect that a 
service supp li ed in relation to a secu rity, including the servi ce of advertising the security, amount · to a 
financia l service. 
6 
relevant Australian law and the arguments supporting, and opposing, the exclusion of the 
TPA. It will also determine whether these arguments are equally valid in the New 
Zealand context. 
The paper will ultimately conclude that the securities market should be regulated by the 
tailor-made securities legislation and the application of the Fr A should be excluded. This 
is primarily due to the inherent differences in the securities market such as risk and 
imperfect information, and in that regard the imposition of a strict liability offence would 
be inappropriate and unjust. 
II THE FAIR TRADING ACT 
A Background 
Conceived by the Fourth Labour Government to implement its 1984 election policy for 
"consumer Jaw reform",20 the FT A repealed the "hotchpotch"21 of provisions that 
previously existed in the consumer protection arena. 22 These former Acts were perceived 
to be deficient because they did not set clear standards for trade descriptions and trading 
conduct, nor did they allow for direct remedy to the affected parties, and did not include a 
general product safety regime. Moreover many of the common law remedies were also 
seen to be especially difficult to satisfy because of the requirement of intention or fraud. 23 
Access to remedies provided under contract were also regarded as extraordinarily 
complicated and in that way did not cater particularly well to the consumer context. With 
the enactment of the Fr A many of these concerns were alleviated. Like other consumer 
protection legislation, the Fr A focussed on the effects of the contravening conduct and in 
doing so conferred a civil remedy regardless of whether the person who supplied the 
2° Commerce Comm ission The Fair Trading Act 1986: Explanatory Booklet (Wellington, 1987) 
[Explanatory Booklet]. 
21 Lindsay Trotman Misrepresentation and the Fair Trading Act (Dunmore Press Ltd, Palmerston North , 
New Zealand, 1988) 1. 
22 Among the other Acts repealed were the Employment Agents Act 1908, the Labour Department Act 
1952, the Employment Agents Amendment Acts of 1960, 1967 and 1975, the Wool Labelling Act 1949 
and the Safety of Ch ildren's Night Clothes Act 1977. 
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information caused the mistake, or had exercised due diligence to avoid the mistake 
which had occurred. 
Therefore the Act was initiated to protect the consumer24 containing implicit recognition 
that the assumption of equality of bargaining power was no longer valid, and that the 
consumer was not in the best position to look after their own interests. 25 As a companion 
to the Commerce Act 1986, the Ff A was designed to enable consumers to take advantage 
of increased competition by ensuring they received accurate information in order to make 
ra tional choices in the marketplace. Thus the Ff A provisions provide direct benefit to 
consumers in the protection it affords, but also give general economic benefit to New 
Zealand as a whole by allowing informed consumers to be the arbitrators of competitive 
rivalry .26 
Equally important functions, as mentioned by the long title, include the prohibition of 
certain conduct and practices in trade and the promotion of product safety. In thi s regard, 
it is not uncommon for rival traders to use the provisions of the Ff A to terminate unfair 
practices employed by unethical traders. Following logically, it can be easily accepted 
that the Act can be validly applied to a wide range of strictly commercial and trading 
activities with little or no relevance to consumer protection. Such an approach has been 
refl ected judicially, where the courts allowed the general provision to apply to a wide 
range of non-consumer transactions . 
21 Fo r example, the to rts o f deceit and fraudulent misrepresentati on. 
24 
Dr Bill Sutton MP stated in support of the then Fair T rading Bill tha t " the purpose of the Bill is to pro tect 
the consumer": (11 December 1986) 476 NZPD 6090. This view was endorsed in Trustbank Auckland Ltd 
v ASB Bank Ltd (1 989) 2 NZBLC 103,558, 103563; (1989] 3 NZBLR 385, 390, where the Court o f Appea l 
stated that "co nsumer protection [was] a main obj ect of the Act" . 
25 
Lynden Griggs "The Duty of Disclosure by Vendors in a Conveyance: If Cavea t Vendor, Are We 
Allowing the Camel's Nose of Unrestrained Irrationality Admission to the Tent?" (1998] 7 APLl 155, 166. 
Griggs suggests this was due to the rise of the limited li ability corporation and the separa te ent ity doc trine 
(in cases such as Salomon v Salomon & Co L td (1 897] AC 22), and the co nsequent growth and 
development of the large institution (bo th private and gove rnment). 
26 
Explanatory Booklet above n20. 
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This has raised some concern. By employing general concepts the Fr A has the ability to 
replace existing common Jaw doctrines, not to mention circumvent established legal 
regimes. Whether this is desirable has divided both academic and judicial comment and it 
remains unclear how far the Act 's potentially wide-reaching effects will extend. 
It is also important to add that the Fr A was also introduced as a means of facilitating free 
trade between New Zealand and Australia under the Closer Economic Relations 
Agreement (CER). 27 To this end, incompatible consumer protection measures were 
regarded as an impediment to free trade. Therefore the Act is modeled closely on Part V 
of the Trade Practices Act 1974 and many of its provisions have been taken from, or are 
identical to, Australian legislation. Because of this, the New Zealand Court of Appeal 
commented in Taylor Bras Ltd v Taylors Textile Services Auckland Ltd28 that as far as 
reasonably practicable, consistency in the application of the Australian and New Zealand 
Acts should be aimed at. 
B Application of the PTA to the Securities Market 
I Introduction 
The FTA only applies to conduct or statements that are "in trade". The word " trade" is 
defined in section 2(1) as meaning:29 
(A]ny trade, business, industry, profession, occupation, activity of commerce, or 
undertaking relating to the supply or acquisition of goods and servi ces or to the 
disposition o r acquisition of any interest in land . 
27 
Y van Roy Competition Laws (CCH New Zealand Ltd , Auckl and, 1991) 35 1, 351. For as the Hon. 
Marga ret Shields, the then Minister of Consumer Affairs, noted : " the Bill brings the law substantiall y into 
line with provisions enforced in Australia since 1974, which have proved so successful ... [it] also 
represents a step towards compliance with article 12 of the Closer Economic Relations agreement, by 
harmonising the commerci al laws of the two countri es": (11 December 1986) 476 NZPD 6088. 
28 
Taylor Eros Ltd v Taylors Textile Services Auckland Ltd [1988] 2 NZLR l ; (1 988) 2 T CLR 447; [1 988] 
2 NZBLC 103,032 (CA) [Tay lor Eros]. 
29 
In th e Supreme Court of South Australi a decision of Esanda Finance Corporation v Peat Marwick 
Hungerfords (29 September 1994) Unreported, Supreme Court o f South Australi a, BC9400806, Bo ll and J 
noted that the words " trade and commerce" are to be g iven the widest import. 
9 
Accordingly, the question of whether the Ff A applies to the issue of securities turns on 
whether they fall within the definition of being a "good" or a "service". Securities are 
defined under the Securities Act 1978 in section 2D as "any interest or right to participate 
in any capital, assets, earnings, royalties, or other property of any other person and 
includes; 
(a) An equity security; 
(b) A debt security; 
( c) A unit in a unit trust; 
(d) An interest in a superannuation scheme; 
(e) A life insurance policy; 
(f) Any interest or right that is declared by regulations to be a security for the purposes of 
this Act; and 
(g) Any renewal or variation of the terms or conditions of any such interest or right." 
Equity securities are primarily shares in a company and comprise of legal rights and 
obligations in relation to that company. They have been historically regarded as a chose 
in action. A chose in action is a legal expression used to describe all personal rights of 
property which can only be enforced by action, that is, by the taking of proceedings 
through the Courts, and not by taking physical possession. This is because these property 
interests are incapable of physical possession.30 
2 Are Shares Goods? 
The FTA defines "goods" inclusively, which includes ships, aircraft and vehicles, animals 
and fish, minerals, trees, crops, gas and electricity.3 1 This same definition is contained 
within the Commerce Act 1986 and it is unclear whether this it would extend to include 
30 Laws of New Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington, 1992) Choses in Action, para 1, l. 
31 The FrA, section 2(1). 
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shares. Commonly cited as conclusive is the decision of CBP Industries Ltd v Bowker 
Holdings No.16 Ltd. 32 ln this decision Hardie Boys J states:33 
For the present purposes I assume, but do not decide, that shares arc goods for the 
purposes of that definition and that therefore section 9 can apply to a takeover bid 
notwithstanding that a comprehensive code in relation to takeovers is set out in the 
Companies Amendment Act. 
Because the decision itself was a interlocutory injunction application, there is scant 
analysis on this point. Nevertheless subsequent decisions, Miln v Stratford Fisheries Ltd
34 
and Jagwar Holdings Ltd v Julian, 35 both cite CBP Industries as authority for the 
proposition that shares are goods. Furthermore it has been suggested that because the 
rights attaching to shares are encapsulated within a document, capable of being 
transferred, assigned or distributed, this would be within the Act's definition of 
"goods".36 For the reasons outlined below, it is respectfully submitted that this conclusion 
is incorrect. 
In Electricity Supply Association of New Zealand Inc v Commerce Commission37 Neazor 
J cited the Oxford English Dictionary and Black's Law Dictionary and held that the 
"thread of tangibility"38 ran through the ordinary meaning of 'goods ' . Therefore because 
shares are typically intangible rights in companies, on this interpretation shares would not 
be included as goods for the purpose of the FT A. For this reason, shares were expressly 
32 CBP industries Ltd v Bowker Holdings No.16 Ltd (1987) 3 NZCLC 100,035 [CBP Industries]. 
33 CBP industries above n32, 100,038. 
34 Miln v Stratford Fisheries Ltd (1988) 4 NZCLC 64,428. 
35 Jagwar Holdings above nl 6. 
36 Seng Kok Chew "Implications of the Fair Trading Act 1986 for Commerc ia l Co nduct in New Zealand" 
unpublished LLB(Hons) paper, Victoria University of Wellingto n (1987), 111 [Chew]. 
37 Electricity Supply Association of New Zea land In c v Commerce Commission (1998) 6 NZBLC 102,555 
[Electricity Supply Association] . 
38 E lectricity Supply Association above 11 37, 102,561. 
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excluded from the Sale of Goods Act 1908.39 This conclusion has also received judicial 
support.40 
Furthermore the specific inclusion of electricity under the Ff A, the Commerce Act and 
the Crimes Act 196141 has been viewed as an intentional exception to the tangible 
definition. Following logically, because shares have not been expressly included in the 
definition, the clear legislative intent was to exclude all other intangibles, including 
shares. Therefore it is suggested that the meaning of the word 'goods' cannot stretch to 
include shares. 
3 Are Shares Services? 
Conversely, it has been argued that shares may more appropriately fall within the 
definition of "services". The Ff A defines "services" widely as including" ... any rights 
(including rights in relation to, and interests in, real or personal property), benefits, 
privileges, or facilities that are or are to be provided, granted, or conferred ... " .42 Because 
shares are, in essence, a bundle of legal rights and obligations in relation to a company, it 
would appear that the rights attached to shares in a company is a right to, or an interest in, 
personal property. 
Moreover under the definition of "services" insurance policies and long term investments 
with a bank are expressly included. Accordingly it would be conceivable that a unit in a 
unit trust, superannuation schemes and participatory securities could also fall within this 
definition. This is because each comprises of " rights in relation to, and interests in, real or 
personal property". This is supported by the width of the words " rights, benefits or 
privileges ... that are to be provided, granted, or conferred". On this basis, the writer 
39 Under the Sales of Goods Act 1908 section 2(1) s tates that goods " includes all chattels personal other 
than money or things in action". 
40 In Pont Data Australia Pty Ltd v ASX Operations Pty Ltd & Anor (1990) ATPR 41-007 the Federal 
Court of Australia held that the ordinary meaning of goods was confined to tangible items. This answered 
the question left open in Toby Construction Products Pty Ltd v Computer Bar Sales Pty Ltd (1984) 50 ALR 
684 whether an intangible would constitute a good. 
41 Crimes Act 1961 , section 218. This section deems e lectricity capable of being s tol e n. 
12 
would assert that this view is preferable. Such an approach has been supported judicially, 
albeit reservedly, by the decision of Fox v Douglas.43 
4 Conclusion 
In many decisions the courts have easily accepted that the Ff A applies to dealings in 
securities. In doing so reliance is often placed on the assumption made in CBP Industries 
and do not therefore consider whether shares are "goods" or "services". This can be 
illustrated by the decision of Megavitamin Laboratories (NZ) Ltd v Commerce 
Commission. 44 In this decision the court held that where a person takes an active part in 
the activities of the company, such as the sale of shares, the person may be acting " in 
trade" and therefore liable for their conduct. The court did not consider whether the share 
would be a "good" _or a "service" . Needless to say, there are of course, countless other 
cases.45 
C Liability Under Section 9 -Misleading or Deceptive Conduct 
1 Overview 
Section 9 of the Fr A is a statutory prohibition imposing civil liability at the courts 
discretion .46 For the purposes of this paper section 5247 of the TPA is materially identical 
to section 9 of the FT A, which provides: 
42 T he ITA, section 2(1). 
43 Fox v Douglas (1988) 4 NZCLC 64,287 [Fox v Douglas]. ln thi s decision Eichelbaum J held that the 
plaintiff had raised an arguable case that shares were services under th e ITA. Unfortunately, the Court did 
not proceed to decide the issue. 
44 Megavitamin Laboratories (NZ) Ltd v Commerce Commission (1995) 6 TCLR 231; (1995) 5 NZBLC 
103,834. 
45 See, fo r example, Jagwar Holdings above nl 6; N RMA above nlO, Fox v Douglas above n43; and other 
cases mentioned above, nl6. 
46 The IT A, sections 41 and 43. 
47 Section 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 provides: A corporation shall not, in trade or commerce, 
engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive. 
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No person shall, in trade, engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to 
mislead or deceive. 
In many early decisions the courts felt compelled to add the extra requirement of a 
misrepresentation to the plain and ordinary words of the statute. The purpose of doing so 
was to limit the general provisions of the Ff A and in this way preserve established 
common law doctrines. Eventually disproved, the approach of Deane and Fitzgerald JJ is 
typified in Taco Co of Australia v Taco Bell Pty Ltd where their Honours note:48 
Irrespective of whether the conduct produces or is likely to produce confusion or 
misconception , it cannot, for the purposes of section 52, be categorised as misleading or 
deceptive unless it contains or conveys, in all the circumstances of the case, a 
misrepresentation. 
This was subsequently followed by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Unilever NZ Ltd 
v Cerebos Greggs Ltd49 and the High Court in Bonz Group Pty v Cooke. 50 However, the 
predominant view, and clearly the correct view, is that in all cases the essential issue will 
be whether or not the words of the statute apply to the particular facts established. This is 
because the provision employs general concepts and does not import common law 
interpretations and restrictions. In Paper Plus NZ Ltd v Robert Mitchell Ltd51 Thomas J 
succinctly said of section 9: 
The section uses plain language and its meaning and intent are clear enough without 
refining or adding to its terms. It does not need a glossa ry. 
Similarly in Taylor Bros52 McGechan J added: 
48 Taco Co of Australia v Taco Bell Pty Ltd (1982) 42 ALR 177, 202; ATPR 40-277, 43 ,751 [Taco Co]. 
49 Unilever NZ Ltd v Cerebos Greggs Ltd (1994) 6 TCLR 187, 192 [Unilever]. 
50 Bonz Croup Pty v Cooke [1994] 3 NZLR 216; (1994) 6 TCLR 23. 
51 Paper Plus NZ Ltd v Robert Mitchell Ltd (10 March 1993) unrepo rted , High Court, Auckland Registry, 
CL 53/92. 
52 Taylor Bras Ltd v Taylors Textile Services Auckland Ltd (1987) 2 TCLR 415, 440 (HC) affirmed above 
n28; Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 191; (1982) 42 ALR 1; 
(1982) ATPR 40-307 [Parkdale]. 
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[T]he provisions concerned are to be construed in their natural and ordinary meaning. In 
particul ar, they arc not to be read down eith er by reference to other provisions of the 
legisla tion o r by reference to the general law. 
Analogous views have been taken in many other decisions.53 Finally, it is also important 
to note that the section is not constrained by the more specific provisions of sections 10, 
11, and 12 in respect of misleading conduct relating to the nature of goods, services and 
employment. 
2 The Purpose of Section 9 
The function of section 9 is to establish a mm1mum standard for conduct in trade or 
commerce. In doing so, the provision, rather than imposing a duty to disclose, maintains 
an obligation not to mislead or deceive. In effect therefore, section 9 is an attempt to 
prescribe, by statute, a minimum level of probity and fairness to which it is in the public 
interest that trading and commercial behaviour conform. 
The FT A also serves as a valuable residual prov1s10n to catch newly conceived 
misleading and deceptive practices beyond the specific prohibitions, and in this way 
allows the courts to focus on the substance of the conduct rather than its form. 
53 Sec, for example, Prudential Building & In vestment Sac of Canterbury v Prudential A ssurance Co of NZ 
Ltd [1 988] 2 NZLR 653, 658; (1 988) 2 NZBLC 103,35 1, 103,356, also repo rted as Prudential Assurance 
Co of NZ Ltd v Prudential Building & In vestment Sac of Canterbury (1 988) 3 T CLR 62, 67 where th e 
Court o f Appeal rejected the requirement o f a misrepresentation by no ting that "while the tort of pass ing 
off invo lves proo f of a misrepresentation ... th e prov isions of secti on 9 of the Fr A require no more th an 
conduct, in trade, which is ' misleading or deceptive o r is likely to mislead o r deceive'". In Henjo 
In vestments Pty Ltd v Collins Marrickville Pty Ltd (1 988) 79 ALR 83, 93; ATPR 40-850, 49,1 51, Lockhart 
J was of the view th at " it is erro neo us to approach [ secti on 9] on the assumptio n th at its applica ti on is 
confined exclusively to circumstances which constitute some fo rm of representation ... ultimately in each 
case it is necessa ry to examine th e conduct, whether representational in character or no t, and as k th e 
question whether th e impugned co nduct o f its nature constitutes mi sleading or deceptive co nduct". Sec 
other s imil ar comments in Brown v The Jam Fa ctory P ty Ltd (1 981) ATPR 40-213 and Trustbank above 
n24, 388. 
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Specifically applied to the securities market, any conduct, including advertising, the issue 
of and the statements contained within prospectuses or investment statements, and notices 
of meetings, is within the ambit of section 9. This includes conduct effecting both the 
primary and secondary market for securities. Furthermore, the obligation not to mislead 
or deceive is applied irrespective of any disclosure obligations required under the existing 
securities legislation. 
3 What Constitutes 'Misleading Conduct '? 
To determine whether section 9 has been breached the most helpful approach is that 
suggested by Tipping J in the Court of Appeal decision of AMP Finance NZ Ltd v 
Heaven. 54 On this approach it is necessary to establish three steps: 
1. Ask whether the conduct was capable of being misleading; 
2. Decide whether the plaintiffs were in fact misled by that conduct;55 and 
3. Decide whether it was reasonable for the plaintiffs to have been misled by that 
conduct. 
(a) Misleading conduct 
Misleading conduct can be an act, including a statement, or an omission to act or speak.56 
Silence itself is not misleading, but silence when there is a duty to speak, or where the 
silence would confirm another fal se meaning, is .57 For, as Gault J commented in 
Unilever: 58 
54 AMP Finance NZ Ltd v Heaven (1 997) 8 TCLR 144; (1 998) 6 NZBLC 102,414 (CA). This approach has 
subsequently been foll owed by the Court of Appea l in Lane Croup Ltd v DI & L Paterson Ltd (2000) 1 
NZLR 129, and by the High Court in La wton v Norcross (2000) 9 TCLR 338 per Paterson J, Parore v 
Berryman (23 September 1999) unreported, Nicholson J, High Court, Auckland Regi try, CP 599/96 and 
Looker v Till (6 December 1999) unreported, Willli ams J, High Court, New Plymouth Registry, CP 17/95 . 
55 This limb, while not explicit, introduces the concept of reliance. In addition, it has been he ld that a 
causa tive nexus must exist between the damage and the conduct: Phyllis Ca le v Elliot (25 September 1997) 
unreported, High Court, Auckland Registry, HC 45/97. 
56 The IT A, section 2(2). 
57 The Task Force Report above, nl 7, 33, noted that "a failure to disclose a matter will normally onl y be 
misleading or deceptive if th ere is a relevant requirement for the matter to be di sclosed or an expectation 
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The legal obligation is to avoid falsehood, it is not an obligation to provide compendious 
explanations. Of course silence in particular circumstances can amount to a 
misrepre entation as can literal truth but in each case only when as a result there is 
affirmatively conveyed another meaning that is false. 
As Gault J makes clear, the obligation to avoid falsehood includes the obligation to avoid 
creating a misleading impression. Importantly, the court will look not only at the meaning 
that the maker of the statement intended it to convey, but also at the meaning that an 
ordinary person would take from the statement. This is because a statement, or an 
omission to act, will often convey a secondary meaning or further implications from what 
the maker of the statement has said or done. 59 Put simply, the critical question is whether 
the "overall impression" conveyed by any act, or omission to act, is accurate. 
For example, in the High Court decision of Hieber v Barfoot & Thompson Ltct:'0 the 
respondent real estate agent had marketed the property as having "magnificent sea and 
city views". Known by the real estate agent, but unbeknownst to the purchaser, the view 
was soon to be obscured by another building. After approving Australian jurisprudence,61 
Kerr J held that in the circumstance there was a "reasonable expectation" that such a 
material fact would be disclosed, and that the failure to disclose created a misleading and 
deceptive impression. 
that it will be disclosed". For similar comments see also Des Forges v Wright [1996) 2 NZLR 758 per Elias 
J and Lyndsay v Milloy (17 September 1999) Randerson J, High Court, Auckland Registry, CL 35/96, 55. 58 Unilever above n49, 192. 
59 A Borrowdale (ed) Butterworths Commercial Law (4 ed, Butterworths, Wellington , 2000). 60 Hieber v Barfoot & Thompson Ltd (1996) 7 TCLR 301; (1996) 5 NZBLC 104,179. For a similar 
example, in PC Brixton Autos Ltd v Commerce Commission [1990) NZAR 203, 208 [PC Brixton Autos] , 
the appellant was found liable under section 9 for a false odometer reading. His Honour Holland J noted 
that; "a statement by a motor vehicle dealer that a vehicle he is proposing to sell has x kilometers on the 
odometer is, in the absence of qualification or exp lanation and in ordinary circumstances, a representation 
that the vehicle, since new, has traveled approximately the stated number of kilometers". In other words, 
the odometer conveyed a false impression to buyers that the car had in fact done less than the actual 
mileage. 
61 Specifically, Rhone-Poulenc Agrochimie SA v UJM Chemical Services Pty Ltd (1986) 12 FCR 477; 68 
ALR 77; ATPR (Digest) 46-010; Kimberley NZ! Finance Ltd v Torero Pty Ltd (1989) ATPR (Digest) 46-
054; Demagogue Pty Ltd v Ramensky (1992) 39 FCR 31; 110 ALR 608; (1993) ATPR 41-203 and Warner 
v Elders Rural Finance Ltd (1993) 41 FCR 399; 113 ALR 517; ATPR 41-238. 
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Such an analysis can be easily applied to the securities market. Because of the "inherent 
contradiction at the core of every prospectus",62 this being both a selling document and a 
disclosure document, prospectuses by their very nature can give rise to misleading 
impressions. And, because "it is a common human characteristic to believe easily what 
you desire earnestly"63 it is imperative that prospectus statements are accurate, and the 
overall impression conveyed is true. 
While there is no independent duty to disclose under the FT A, but rather an obligation to 
avoid misleading conduct, when coupled with the mandatory disclosure requirements 
under the Securities Act, the obligation becomes very extensive. This point was made 
clear by the Australian Full Federal Court where it was said in relation to the TPA: 64 
Whilst section 52 does not by its terms impose an independent duty of disclosure which 
would require a corporation or its directors to give any particular information ... unless 
the information given constitutes a full and fair disclosure of all the facts which are 
material to enable .. . a properly informed decision, the combination of what is said and 
left unsaid may, depending on the full circumstances, be likely to mislead or deceive. 
In other words, what information is compulsorily required, and that which is not, must 
not be, in all the circumstances, misleading or deceptive. Indeed such a level of disclosure 
could be regarded as entirely justified in the securities market context; the obligation to 
provide information with strict and scrupulous accuracy to the investor for the purposes 
of making informed investment decisions. As will be seen, such a duty would be 
consistent with the concept of materiality at common law, and would enhance the 
mandatory disclosure philosophy embodied within the Securities Act. 
62 Walker "A Model of an Initial Public Offering" (1993) NZULR 396, 414. 
63 R v Baxter ( 4 March 1998) unreported , Judge Erber, District Court, Christchurch, Tll 1/97. 
64 NRMA above nlO, ATPR 40,143. 
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On the other hand, it could be argued that any such disclosure is clearly beyond the 
legislative intent of the Securities Act and in this regard any extension of the disclosure 
would be entirely unjustified. Indeed, any extension of the disclosure obligation ought to 
be within the tailor-made confines of the Securities Act and any overlay a consumer 
related statute provides is clearly inappropriate. 
However, in order to appreciate the argument it will be returned to later in the paper after 
a consideration of the mandated disclosure under the Securities Act. 
(b) Reasonable to be misled? 
Whether conduct is misleading or deceptive is to be determined objectively by the court 
in relation to one or more identified sections of the public. 65 While it is likely that the 
relevant section of the public will constitute the public at large, it also possible for the 
conduct, and the effects of such conduct, to be limited to an identified section. For 
example in Unilever, where the complaint was against misleading statements made on 
coffee products, the relevant section of the public was limited to the purchasers, or 
potential purchasers, of coffee. 
In considering whether it was reasonable to be misled, the court can have regard to the 
identity, experience, and knowledge of the persons claiming to be misled or deceived.66 
Therefore the relevant question is; whether a reasonable person, in the shoes of the person 
who was misled and possessing their knowledge actual and implied, would have been 
misled. 
4 Liability 
65 The public will include "the astute and the gullible, the intelligent and the not so intelligent, the well educated as well as the poorly educated, men and women of various ages pursuing a variety of vocations": quoted by Wilcox J in Chase Manhatten Overseas Corp v Chase Corp (1985) 8 ATPR 47,328, 47,336 from Taco above n48 , ALR 202; ATPR 43-752. 
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In order for a successful action under section 9 reliance, causation and loss must be 
shown. This was helpfully summarised by the Court of Appeal in Savill v NZ! Finance 
Ltd where it was said;67 
Before the court may make an order by way of relief under the Fair Trading Act for a 
breach of section 9 it is necessary for the appellants to show that their loss was caused by 
the conduct of the person who contravenes the Act. That is to say there must be proof of 
causation or nexus between the misleading and or the deceptive conduct and the loss or 
damage suffered. 
In this context, while reliance must be shown, it need not be shown that the representation 
was the sole influence in the decision to rely on the misleading conduct.68 In this way the 
element of materiality is introduced to the Ff A: liability arises if the conduct is a material 
factor in a plaintiffs decision, and must be shown to be so by the plaintiff, even if only a 
relatively minor factor. 69 Similarly like section 56, section 9 does not require specific 
reliance on the misstatement, but rather on the advertisement or prospectus which 
contained the statement.70 
Finally, it is important to add that liability under section 9 does not require intention or 
knowledge. This was illustrated by P C Brixton Autos Ltd v Commerce Commission71 
where the motor vehicle dealer, regardless of knowledge, fault or intention, was found to 
have contravened section 9 in supplying motor vehicles with falsified odometer readings. 
Applied to the securities context, liability would be imposed under the Ff A 
notwithstanding any personal or substantive defences afforded under the Securities Act. 
Such a result would clearly circumvent the clear legislative intention of the Securities 
66 DSJ (PTE) Ltd v TPF Restaurants Ltd (23 December 1997), Giles J, High Court, Auckland Registry, CP 
168/96. 
67 Savill v NZI Finance Ltd (1990] 3 NZLR 135, 143. 
68 Coldsbro v Walker, above n4, 401. 
69 Jagwar Holdings above nl6, 68,097. 
70 Peter Fitzsimons " If the Truth Be Known: The Securities Act 1978 and Directors Liability for 
Misstatements in a Prospectus (Part II)" (2000) 6 NZBLQ 235, 237. 
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Act. Assuming such circumvention is undesirable, this result supports the exclusion of 
the FfA. 
5 Who can sue? 
Under section 43(1) any person may apply for relief, whether or not they suffered the loss 
or damage, and any person who suffers loss or damage may be granted a remedy whether 
or not they are a party to the proceedings.72 Clearly this means that in many cases the 
complainant will not always be the plaintiff, and can be easily illustrated in instances 
where the Commerce Commission brings an action on behalf of affected consumers. 
6 Who can be Sued? 
The Ff A attaches liability to any person who, by their conduct, contravenes the Act. 
Furthermore, liability is extended to those who aid, abet, counsel, or procure the 
contravention and will include any person who is in any way directly or indirectly 
knowingly concerned in, or party to, the contravention.73 
These respective provisions cast a wide net as to the scope of potential plaintiffs or 
defendants. It is evident that such an approach could be considered appropriate within the 
consumer protection confines in allowing deserving plaintiffs to achieve justice. 
However, in the securities context, such an approach raises the uncertain prospect of 
liability. While this concern has not been explored to its ultimate conclusion, it is 
explicitly clear that the Ff A could apply to a wider range of defendants. Again, whether 
this is desirable is rather uncertain. 
7 1 PC BrixtonAutos above n60. 
72 BMW NZ Ltd v Pepi Holdings Ltd (1996) 7 TCLR 357; 6 NZBLC 102,060 (digest) affirmed by Pepi 
Holdings Ltd v BMW NZ Ltd (25 August 1997) CA 22/97 per Elias J. 
73 The FTA, section 43(l)(a)(b) and (d).Section 43(1)(c) extends liability to those who induce by threats, 
promises or otherwise, and section 43(1)(e) includes those who conspire with any other person to 
contravene the Act. 
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7 Defences under the FTA 
Under the Ff A there are a number of criminal defences under section 44. Unfortunately, 
no statutory defences exist for a civil prosecution under section 9. While not aptly 
described as a defence, it is important to note that a reasonably held opinion does not 
constitute misleading conduct.74 In this regard it is arguable that personal statements 
contained within a prospectus may not be misleading where the opinion in the 
circumstances was reasonable or that the opinion expressed was actually genuine. 
However such a 'defence' would not extend to those matters stated as fact. Therefore it is 
clear that an anomaly would result, a due diligence defence under the Securities Act 
although no protection from the Ff A. 
D Limiting the FTA 
Led by the rousmg dicta of Hammond J, the courts have sought to preserve the 
established commercial law from the "cancerous" Ff A in a number of ways. Firstly, 
judges have attempted to place textual limitations on the wording of the provision. 
Unfortunately, because of the simplicity of section 9, it was evident that such an approach 
would be to no avail.75 Instead the courts sought refuge in the secure common law, as was 
evident in Taco and Cox & Coxon Ltd v Leipst. 76 In Cox & Coxon the Court of Appeal 
applied the tortious measure of damages to section 43(2)(d) and did not follow the 
discretionary approach to remedies as pioneered by the same court in Goldsbro v 
Walker. 77 
In Goldsbro the Court of Appeal decided that the power to award payment of the full loss 
or damage encompassed the power to award part of the amount, and thus illustrated the 
74 Global Sportsman Pty Ltd v Mirror Newspapers Pty Ltd (1984) 2 FCR 82; Bateman v Slatyer (1987) 71 
ALR 553. 
75 Accepted by Hammond J in Crump v Wala , above nl , 343. 
76 Cox & Coxon Ltd v Leipst [1999] 2 NZLR 15 ; (1998) 8 TCLR 516. 
77 Goldsbro v Walker above n4. This decision was followed by Quick Snax Ltd v Uncles Group (NZ) Ltd 
( L9 June 1998) unreported, High Court, Auckland Registry, CP1137/92, where Thorp J noted that section 
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discretionary nature of section 43(2)(d). In doing so, the Court rejected the common law 
rule where a tortfeaser whose wrongful conduct contributed to cause damage was liable 
for the whole damage to the plaintiff. Such a conclusion, according to Cooke P, allows 
the Act to work in accordance with its true intent, meaning and spirit and enables the 
Court to grant a remedy that gives effect to the policy of the Act without at the same time 
being draconian or doing injustice.78 
Such a result would be at odds with the sentiment of Hammond J. His Honour was 
concerned that by rejecting of the use of common law analogies the Fr A would create 
remedial uncertainty and would open the door for the widespread circumvention of 
established common law doctrines. Be that as it may, these conflicting cases serve to 
illustrate the apparent dissention in the Court of Appeal over the use of common law 
analogies. It is clear that the majority in Cox & Coxon, Henry, Blanchard, and Gault JJ, 
sought to limit the applicability of the reasoning in Goldsbro, while the minority, 
Richardson P and Tipping J, followed the reasoning with educated conformity. It would 
appear that Hammond J would quite clearly agree with the majority, while Thomas J, 
speaking extra-judicially, expressed a clear preference for the minority .79 
Alternatively the courts have attempted to interpret the statute in accordance with, and 
subject to, other commercial legislation. Brennan J best summarises this approach to 
interpretation in Park.dale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd where he said;80 
43 provided the court with a wide range of discretionary powers, "a special package of remedies" which 
supercede conventional common law rules. 
78 Coldsbro v Walker above n4, 399. ln Cumberworld Contracting Ltd v Foseco (NZ) Ltd (1993) 5 (TCLR) 
534 affirmed by Foseco (NZ) Ltd v Cumberworld Contracting Ltd (1997) 6 NZBLC 102,033, the court 
awarded damages that reflected the proportion of the damage actually caused by the defendant ' s conduct. 
Similarly in Fletcher Construction NZ and South Pacific Ltd v Cable Street Properties Ltd (9 September 
1999) unreported, CA 271/98, the Court of Appeal reduced the damages awarded by the High Court by 
50% in recognition of the respondents' contribution to their own loss. 
79 E W Thomas "An Endorsement of a More Flexible Law of Civil Remedies" in New Zealand Law 
Conference Civil Remedies Papers, April 1999, 9n. 
80 Parkdale above n52, 225; 27. For similar comments see Concrete Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd v Nelson 
(1990) 169 CLR 594, 603-604 per Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ and Webb Distributors (Aust 
Pty Ltd v State of Victoria (1993) 179 CLR 15, 37 per Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ. 
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Section 52 operates in a milieu of the external legal order, so that the character of 
conduct which falls for consideration under section 52 is to be determined by reference to 
the external legal order as it exists when the conduct is engaged in. 
Thus in order to avoid displacing other established legal regimes the courts have 
attempted to view the provisions of the FT A coherently with other existing legislation. 
This would appear to be consistent with section 50(1) of the FT A where the operation of 
any other enactment is expressly preserved. This approach can be illustrated by the 
decision in Parkdale where Brennan J held that the defendant's copying of an 
unregistered design was impliedly permitted by the Designs Act 1906 (Cth) which 
provided for the registering of designs, so that it could not be considered misleading 
behaviour under the Australian TP A. In this way his Honour held that where a specific 
provision has been made for certain types of situation then to apply the FTA would 
provide a remedy by a side wind. 
In the writer's opm10n, while such a result is desirable, the approach of the court is 
untenable. It would seem absurd that the court would simply be able to ignore the clear 
provisions of the legislation. Indeed such an interpretation has not received judicial 
support. It is suggested that a better approach would be to interpret the statute within the 
external legal order by using the discretion inherent in section 43 of the FT A. This would 
allow the Act to be interpreted in harmony with its original purpose and by uninhibiting 
the wide and discretionary remedies of the FT A the courts would have the ability to 
administer justice to the particular circumstances of the case. By doing so, the courts 
would conform to the existing legislative landscape and would therefore provide certainty 
and consistency without circumventing established legal regimes.81 
81 For example, the remedies provided for under the ITA should not circumvent the Contractual Remedies 
Act 1979, but should provide analogous remedies, and therefore preserve the inherent scope and purpose of 
such legislation. 
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In this way, the reasoning of Cox & Coxon, criticised for stifling the flexible approach to 
the Act and for neglecting the plain words of the statute, 82 could be considered to have 
been decided wrongly. By using the courts discretion under section 43, and hence 
considering the existence of existing legislation, the same result would have been reached 
albeit without arbitrary restraints on the Courts ability to administer justice. The external 
legal order in this case would be the existence of the Contractual Remedies Act 1979 that 
was enacted in order to enforce contractual promises and thereby allowing the contractual 
measure of damages. Therefore by importing common law doctrines the decision 
undermined the 'basket of remedies' approach and, in effect, compromised the initiative 
of the FfA. 
Undoubtedly, such an approach has its limitations. These would include, for example, 
where two legislative enactments cannot be reconciled, or where the provisions of the 
Ff A cannot simply award a comparable remedy.83 Applied to the securities context, in 
order to award a comparable remedy under the Ff A personal and substantive defences 
must be given effect to under the discretionary section 43. Consistent with such an 
approach is the courts unwillingness to accept that a remedy under section 43 is conferred 
as of right. 84 This would potentially allow the existence of a due diligence defence to 
exclude liability under the Ff A. While such an interpretation is possible, it is highly 
unlikely. It is unclear whether the dicta in Goldsbro could stretch that far and it would 
also seem inappropriate within the context of a consumer protection statute. It could also 
compromise the original intent of the legislation and give rise to great uncertainty. 
Moreover in many cases to date such an approach would have been simply considered 
absurd. 
Of course, the most efficient method to relieve New Zealand's legislative landscape of the 
Fr A's devastating effect is to legislate. In this regard the Task Force recommendations 
82 Andrew Beck "Fair Trading Act Remedies" (1999) 4 NZLJ 97; Brian Keene "Fair Trading Act Damage: 
A Statutory Test" (1999) 4 NZLJ 107. 
83 An example of this is an exclusion clause, while effective under the Contractual Remedies Act 1979, 
under the FT A such a clause would have no effect. 
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provide clarity to Australian securities law, while New Zealand, arguably, is left with less 
than satisfactory common law solutions. 
III DISCLOSURE AT COMMON LAW 
In response to unscrupulous promoters selling securities to the public on false grounds, 
the common law attached a disclosure obligation of utmost good faith on promoters. 
Kindersley VC laid down this obligation in 1860 in New Brunswick and Canada Railway 
and Land Co v Muggeridge85 by commenting: 
Those who issue a prospectus, holding out to the public the great advantages which will 
accrue to persons who will take shares in a proposed undertaking, and inviting them to 
take shares on the faith of the representations therein contained, are bound to state 
everything with strict and scrupulous accuracy, and not only to abstain from stating as 
facts that which is not so, but to omit no one fact within their knowledge, the existence of 
which might in any degree affect the nature, or extent, or quality of the privileges and 
advantages which the prospectus holds out as inducements to take shares. 
Cited with approval, Lord Chelmsford added in Central Rly Co of Venezuela (Directors) 
v Kisch: 86 
In my opinion the public, who are invited by a prospectus to join in any new adventure, 
ought to have the same opportunity of judging everything which has a material bearing 
on its true character, as the promoters themselves possess. 1t cannot be too frequently or 
too strongly impressed upon those who, having projected any undertaking, are desirous 
of obtaining the co-operation of persons who have no other information on the subject 
84 Coldsbro v Walker, above n4. 
85 New Brunswick and Canada Railway and Land Co v Muggeridge (1860) 1 Drew & Sm 363, 381 
[Muggeridge]. This statement of the law was regarded by Page Wood YC in Henderson v Lacon (1867) LR 
5 Eq 249, 262 as the "golden legacy" . 
86 Central Rly Co of Venezuela (Directors) v Kisch (1867) LR 2 HL 99, 113 [Kisch]. This decision was 
followed by Peek v Curney (1873) LR 6 HL 377 [Peek v Curney] where the Court held that a prospectus 
must not misrepresent actual and material facts or conceal material facts that might properly influence the 
minds of potential investors. 
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than that which they choose to convey, that the utmost candour and honesty ought to 
characteri e their published statements. 
Under this duty, promoters were to exercise strict and scrupulous accuracy towards the 
companies they incorporated and to characterise their published statements with utmost 
candour and honesty. Therefore at common law non-disclosure was only actionable 
where as a result the prospectus became false or misleading.87 A prospectus would only 
become false or misleading if, viewing the prospectus as a whole, an impression arose 
from statements present that the whole truth has not been disclosed. For example, in R v 
Kylsant88 the English Court of Criminal Appeal convicted Lord Kylsant for making a 
statement which he knew to be "false in a material particular"89 after purporting to be a 
profitable entity. The material omission was that the profit stated was inflated by reserves, 
and that the entity was actually making operating losses. 
However, while the common law developed rules that dealt with the need to disclose 
information, it proved inadequate in dealing with misrepresentations. This was illustrated 
in the decision of Derry v Peek:0 where the House of Lords held that in order to succeed 
for a claim of deceit the plaintiffs needed to establish actual fraud , even though the action 
could be defeated if the directors showed honesty in belief, even if the belief was 
unreasonable, so long as it was not reckJess. The English Parliament responded with the 
Directors ' Liability Act 1890 (UK), which held a director liable to any subscriber for " the 
loss or damage they may have sustained by reason of any untrue statement in the 
prospectus".91 This was subsequently followed in New Zealand with the Promoters and 
Directors Liability Act 1891. Rather than focussing on the promoters ' disclosure 
obligation of utmost good faith towards the company, the Acts shifted the emphasis to the 
87 Aaron 's Reefs Ltd v Twiss [1896] AC 273; Muggeridge above n85, Peek v Gurney above n86, Kisch 
above n86. 
88 R v Lord Kylsant [1932] 1 KB 442. 
9 Larceny Act 186 1, section 84. 
90 Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337 (HL). 
9 1 Directors ' Liability Act 1890, section 3(1). 
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philosophy of mandatory disclosure. 92 In this way the Acts ensured that liability would 
attach for misstatements and did not allow relief be determined solely by the existing and 
somewhat burdensome common law actions. 
IV THE SECURITIES ACT 1978 
A Generally 
The Securities Act 1978 was enacted in New Zealand in the wake of a series of financi al 
collapses,93 notably culminating in the Securitibank failure in 1976, that left many 
investors with substantial losses.94 Many of those who invested did so without the benefit 
of a registered prospectus or disclosure document. The inevitable conclusion that 
followed was that the existing legislation was inadequate to protect the investing public 
and that there was a need for stronger investor protection laws.95 
The principal policy of New Zealand ' s securities law96 is to regulate capital raising by 
detailed disclosure to the public. Provided investors are given the information necessary 
to make properly informed decisions, the individual is better able to determine what is in 
92 Fitzsimons " If the Truth be Known : The Securities Act 1978 and Directors' Liability fo r Misstatements 
in a Prospectus (Part I)" (1 999) 5 NZBLQ 164, 166. 
93 Other notable co llapses include Cornish, Mark Craig Group, Circuit Developments, Perpetual T rustees 
Company, JBL, Gemco, and Universal Management. 
94 See Ministry of Economic Development and the Securities Commission Review of the Securities 
Regulations 1983 (Stage one); Discussion Document (July 2000) 6. 
95 Gaskell "Some Problems of Definiti on in the Securities Act 1978" unpublished LLB(Hons) paper, 
Victoria University of Wellington (1 979), 3. For a detailed acco unt of New Zealand 's securiti es history see 
Lindroos and Walker "A Short History of Securities Regulation in New Zea land" and P McKenzie 
"Reforming Securities Regulation in New Zealand" in Walker and Fisse (eds) Securities Regulation in 
Australia and New Zealand (Oxford University Press, Oxford , 1994), 35-89; Walker "Reinterpreting New 
Zealand Securiti es Regulation" in Walker, Fisse and Ramsay Securities Regulation in A ustralia and New 
Zealand (2 ed, LBC Information Services, Sydney, 1998), 88 [Walker, Fisse and Ramsay] and Mark R 
Stuart "Civil Liability fo r Prospectus Misstatement: Is T here a Need fo r a Reliance Requirement?" 
unpubli shed LLB(Hons) paper, Victori a University o f Wellington (1996), 2-8. 
96 The terms ' securi ties law ' or ' securiti es legislation' refer to the Securi ties Act 1978, the Securiti es 
Regulations 1983 enacted thereunder, and the Securities Amendment Acts. It is important to note the 
Securities Act and Securiti es Regulations regulate the primary market, while the Securiti es Amendment 
Act 1988 regul ates th e seco ndary market and is direc ted at insider trading, substanti al shareholder 
disclosure and dealings in futures contrac ts. Las tl y, the Amendment Act of 1996 int roduced the two-tier 
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his or her best interests. Such an approach is generally based on the simple founding 
premise of Justice Brandeis of the US Supreme Court that "sunlight is the best 
disinfectant". In Re AJC Merchant Finance Limited Richardson J described the New 
Zealand approach by commenting that: 97 
The pattern of the Securities Act and the sanctions it imposes make it plain that the broad 
statutory goal is to facilitate the raising of capital by securing the timely disclosure of 
relevant information to prospective subscribers for securities. In that way the Act is 
aimed at the protection of investors. That aim is achieved by regulating the conduct of 
issuers of securities and by providing sanctions for infringement by those issuers and 
their officers. 
Importantly, the other aims of the Securities Act include the increasing of investor and 
public confidence in the integrity of the capital market, and the maintenance of an 
internationally competitive investment destination. This is best summarised by the 
Kimber Committee report where it was said in relation to securities law generally:98 
To the extent that securities legislation is improved in the interests of investors, the 
securities industry will benefit from increased public confidence. To the extent that the 
industry becomes a more effective and efficient part of the economy, the general public 
will benefit. 
Securities market regulation enables investors to distinguish good investments from bad 
in a cost-effective way. This is because promoters of bad products are unlikely to 
voluntarily disclose their flaws. In this way, non-disclosure will result in sub-optimal 
investment and an increase in overall search costs for those investors who are prepared to 
remain in the market. Therefore mandatory disclosure strengthens investment confidence 
and economic activity. 
disclosure reg ime and extended the application of the Securities Act to unit trusts, superannuation schemes 
and life insurance policies. 
97 Re AIC Merchant Finance Limited [1990] 2 NZLR 385,391. 
98 Report of the Attorney General's Commiuee on Securities Legislation in Ontario (Ontario , 1965) para 
1.17 ('the Kimber Committee report') as quoted by Lindroos and Walker above 1195. 
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In order to be effective, mandatory disclosure rules require an efficient non-compliance 
system. The more efficient and the greater the potential liability, investors confidence, 
and hence investment, are likely to rise. This confidence must be weighed against the cost 
of imposing liability, as fundraisers will continue to search for new information as long as 
the cost of doing so is less than the risk of exposure to liability. Therefore, the higher the 
potential liability, the greater the incentive to incur costs further. However in saying this, 
when compliance costs become too high, there are strong disincentives on fundraisers for 
seeking equity. Therefore, a system with an appropriate balance between imposing costs 
on fundraisers on the one hand, and attaching liability on the other, will foster an efficient 
capital market. 
In this regard most securities legislation contains a due diligence defence to encourage 
fundraisers to incur reasonable losses in order to avoid liability. In doing so, investor 
confidence and compliance costs remain at an economical balance; investors are well 
informed, while fundraisers, although 'incurring reasonable costs, have access to a healthy 
capital market. 
Lastly, it is important to note that the securities market is unique. Securities are unlike 
physical commodities. Valued by the rights they confer and containing no intrinsic value 
by themselves, securities are created rather than produced, and cannot be consumed. The 
rights that they confer are typically rights to income or capital distributions from a 
business enterprise, so their value depends upon assessing the value of the enterprise. In 
this way, securities are, by their very nature, speculative. Because of this, investors 
should not be deprived of the right to desire high returns or to assume higher risks. The 
role of the Government is not to insure the investor or to uphold a risk-free marketplace, 
but rather to facilitate adequate disclosure in order for rational investment decisions to be 
made. Legislation cannot prevent, nor should it, bad investment decisions by investors. 
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B Overview 
The primary provision of the Securities Act provides that no security shall be offered to 
the public for subscription, by or on behalf of an issuer unless the offer is made in or 
accompanied by a registered prospectus, or is made in an authorised advertisement.99 Any 
allotment of securities that is made without a registered prospectus is void. 100 
Furthermore, any allotment of securities that is made without the subscriber receiving an 
investment statement, or where that investment statement is false or misleading, or where 
the prospectus has dated, is voidable. 101 
It is important to note that since 1 October 1997 the investment statement has replaced 
the prospectus as the primary disclosure document. 102 Considered an advertisement under 
the Securities Act, 103 the investment statement is intended to provide, in a more concise 
and accessible form, the information required by a prudent person to make an informed 
investment decision. This does not, however, preclude the preparation and registration of 
a prospectus, although the prospectus need only be sent to a security holder or 
prospective investor on request104 
C Disclosure Requirements 
The disclosure requirements under the Securities Act are contained with the Securities 
Regulations 1983 and contain two types of information disclosure. Firstly, certain 
provisions, mostly contained within the schedules, require the prospectus to disclose 
particular specified information. This approach to disclosure obligations is often referred 
to as a scheduled or prescriptive approach. Secondly, general disclosure provisions 
require information that is not specifically required to be included, but which is 
99 Securities Act, section 33. 
100 Securities Act, section 37. 
wi Securities Act, section 37A(l)(a)-(c). 
wz The Securities Amendment Act 1996. 
103 Securities Act, section 2D. 
10
4 Securities Act, section 54B(3). Note that because a prospectus will contain detailed financial statements 
for the issuer and related persons, it will contain more information than an investment statement. 
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nonetheless relevant to the offer of securities, to be included m the prospectus. These 
include: 105 
• 
• 
• 
Provisions requiring disclosure of "material" contracts; 106 
Provisions requiring disclosure of other "material matters" relating to the offer of 
securities that are not set out elsewhere in the registered prospectus; 107 and 
Regulation 5(1) of the Securities Regulations 1983, which requires "additional" 
information to be included in a registered prospectus if, without such information, a 
statement in the prospectus would be misleading. 
These general provisions make it clear that the detailed disclosure requirements do not 
provide an exhaustive list of information that should be contained in a prospectus. 
In addition, under section 65 , the Securities Act preserves any other liability under any 
rule of law or other Act. This clearly allows other disclosure obligations and liability 
provisions, including the FTA, to apply to the securities market. 
D Civil Liability under the Securities Act 
1 Section 56 
The Securities Act imposes civil liability for misstatements in prospectuses by virtue of 
section 56. This section provides that certain persons are "liable to pay compensation to 
all persons who subscribe for any securities on the faith of an advertisement or registered 
prospectus which contains any untrue s tatement for the loss they may have sustained by 
reason of such untrue statement" . The following section will analyse the requirements of 
section 56 and in doing so compare them to those of the FT A. 
105 Morisons Company and Security Law (Butterworths, Wellington, 1998), para 16.5 . 
106 Securiti es Regulations 1983, clause 17 of the First Schedule, clause 9 of the Seco nd Schedule, clause 15 
of th e Third Schedule, clause 12 of Schedule 3A, clause 9 o f Schedule 3B and clause 9 of Schedule 3C. 
107 Securities Regulations 1983, clause 40 o f the First Schedule, clause 32 of the Second Schedule, clause 
30 of the Third Schedule, clause 18 of Schedul e 3A, clause 14 of Schedule 3B and clause 14 of Schedule 
3C. 
32 
(a) Untrue statement 
The first important element is the necessity for an untrue statement. This is defined by 
section 55 as : 
(a) A statement included in an advertisement or registered prospectus is deemed to be 
untrue if -
(i) lt is misleading in the form and context in which it is included; or 
(ii) lt is misleading by reason of the omission of a particular which is material to the 
s tatement in the form and context in which it is included. 
The first limb was considered in R v Rada Corp Ltd (No 2) 108 where Barker J held that a 
statement of intention could be misleading if it could be shown that the director did not 
have that intention. Therefore it is clearly open to dispute a stated intention by reference 
to the context in which it is included. This interpretation allows a misstatement to be 
established on the basis of an impression, or implications derived from the whole 
document, without any one statement to be shown to be false. Similar to the approach of 
the Ff A, this approach may be balanced by favouring the defendants in cases of 
ambiguity or confusion. 109 
The second limb of section 55, which deals with an omission of a material particular, has 
been considered a number of times by the courts. 110 The leading New Zealand case on the 
meaning of material is Coleman v Myers. 111 Cooke J, as he then was, set out a broad test 
of materiality as " those considerations which can be reasonably be said , in the particular 
case, to be likely materially to affect the mind of a vendor or of a purchaser" .112 Moreover 
108 R v Rada Corp Ltd (No 2) [1 990] 3 NZLR 453. 
109 Fitzsimons above n92, 177. 
11° For a helpful summary see Fitzsimons, above 11 92, 178-1 94. 
111 Co leman v Myers [1 977] 2 NZLR 225 [Coleman v Myers]. The case concerned the obliga ti ons o f 
directors to di sclose material informati on to shareho lders when advising them on an offer for which the 
directo rs are the purchasers. 
112 Coleman v Myers, above nlll , 334. The reasonable investor s tandard was also adopted by the United 
States Supreme Court decision of Basic In c v Levinson (1 988) 485 US 224, 23 1 fBa sic Inc v L evinson] in 
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the information, while reasonably considered important, does not have to be 
determinative of the investor's decision, but only be taken into account by the investor. 
While there is significant similarity compared with the disclosure requirements under the 
Ff A, there is a slight difference for material omissions. Under the Ff A, silence will only 
amount to misleading conduct where the plaintiff could reasonably have expected the 
defendant to disclose further facts that qualify the statement. This is based on the 
'reasonable expectation' of disclosure approach as evident in Hieber and other Australian 
authority. For example, in NRMA Gummow J held that members were entitled "to 
reasonably expect that what was put before them involved no half truths and contained a 
full and fair disclosure of matters" .113 
Whereas under section 56, it is clear that there must be some positive statement as the 
mere omission to state a material fact will not give rise to a cause of action. Liability for 
the omission of a material fact will only arise where the omission is such as to make a 
positive statement in the prospectus false or misleading. In other words, no action would 
lie if the prospectus merely failed to include certain material information in the 
prospectus, however a cause of action would arise if it could be shown that the 
suppression of that material information resulted in a statement in the prospectus being 
false or misleading. Such a requirement is enforced by regulation 5(1) of the Securities 
Regulations 1983 which require the disclosure of any additional information if, without 
such information, a statement in the prospectus would be misleading. 
However, where there is a positive statement, and the omission of a material particular, 
the approach of section 56 and the Ff A are very alike. This is because the concept of 
materiality under the Securities Act is dependent on the reasonable investor. Any 
reasonable investor would reasonably expect an issuer to disclose any fact that would 
relation to r lOb-5. In that case the court held that an omitted fact is material if there is a substantial 
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important. 
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render a positive statement made misleading or deceptive. In this regard, the reasonable 
expectation of disclosure approach adopted under the Fr A is likely to be very similar, if 
not the same as, the definition of materiality under the Securities Act. 
(b) Reliance 
Secondly it is necessary to prove the causative nexus between the untrue statement and 
the Joss suffered by the plaintiff. Unfortunately, because of the absence of case Jaw, it is 
unclear what level of reliance is required. The prevailing view is that subscribing "on the 
faith" of a prospectus or advertisement requires only that the investor relied directly on 
the prospectus, and need not rely specifically on the untrue statement. n 4 Therefore a 
plaintiff will not have a successful claim where it can be shown that they did not rely on 
the prospectus when investing. Clearly this would include where the plaintiff has placed 
reliance on independent advice or their own judgement, or has simply not read the 
prospectus.11 5 
This result raises some concern. It is arguable that where an investor has relied on the 
advice of an expert and that expert has in tum relied on the prospectus in giving that 
advice, that investor should be presumed to have relied on the prospectus and be able to 
claim for any misstatements in the process . With the Government's express recognition 
of the role of the investment advisor in the investment process with the enactment of the 
Investment Advisers (Disclosure) Act 1996, it would seem a little unfair for those who 
acted out of an excess of caution and sought professional advice. Indeed it does not 
appear that such a claim would be any less deserving than that of another who only 
glanced at the prospectus. 
113 NRMA above n 10, ALR 673. Thi.5 was qualified by the Full Federa l Court by add ing that thi s 
requirement was subject to the need to present a document that is intelligible to reasonable members and 
would be li ke ly to assist rather than confuse. 
114 See Halsbury's Laws of England (4ed , Butterworths, London, 1996 Reissue) vol 7(1) Companies, para 
339. See also the obse rvations of th e Working Group on Improved Investment Product and Investment 
Adviser Disclosure Implementation of Part 4 of the 1993 Accord on R etirement In come Policies: 
Recommendations for Improved In vestment Product and ln vestme11I Adviser Disclosure: Final Report 31 
December 1995 (Wellington, 1995) para 164 [Working Group Report]. 
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Another difficulty has arisen with the enactment of the Securities Amendment Act 1996 
in that many investors may not have received, or even read, the prospectus. It is clear that 
because the investment statement is an advertisement for the purposes of the Securities 
Act, on the clear words of section 56, should the investment statement contain a 
misstatement, and assuming the plaintiff could show loss, a remedy would result. 
However what is unclear, is whether the investor, having relied on an investment 
statement, would be entitled to a remedy where the misstatement is contained within the 
prospectus. It is possible to argue that because the investment statement must state that an 
investor is able to receive a prospectus on request, 116 and any statements referred to in an 
advertisement or prospectus are deemed to be included in an advertisement, 117 that any 
statements in the prospectus are deemed to be included in the investment statement. From 
this analysis if an investor subscribes for the securities on the faith of the investment 
statement, they should have an action under section 56 for misstatements regardless of 
whether they relied on or even received the prospectus. The only requirement being, 
therefore, would be the need to show they relied on the investment statement. 11 8 
Again it is uncertain whether such a result is desirable. It is likely that because many 
investors will not have received the prospectus that most investment decisions will be 
based solely on the investment statement. In this regard it would be logical to assert that 
because no reliance has been placed on the prospectus, which contains the misstatement, 
no remedy should result. 
11 5 Jennings v Broughton (1853) 43 ER 818; (1853) 5 De GM and G 126. 
11 6 Securities Act, section 38E(l )( c ). 
11 7 Securities Act, section 55(1)(b)(iii). 
11 8 This interpretation has been supported by the Working Group Report above n114, para 168, where it 
was briefly noted that "if any statement in an investment statement is untrue, the product provider will be 
liable to any person who subscribed on the faith of the investment statement. Potential liability extends to 
any statement incorporated into an investment statement by reference" . 
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On the other hand, by actively encouraging the use of the investment statement as the 
primary disclosure document, many may not see the need to request a prospectus. Should 
the prospectus contain a misstatement that could directly or indirectly affect the value of 
the investment, those who relied solely on the investment statement would be denied a 
remedy. In this way, it could be argued that a remedy should result where it can be shown 
that reliance has been placed on either disclosure document, whether the investment 
statement or the prospectus. If this were not so, by denying a remedy to those who 
invested merely on the investment statement, would effectively preclude those the law is 
designed to protect. This would undermine the investment statement initiative, and may 
lead to many requesting the prospectus out of an excess of caution. 
Although unclear, it is important to add that under the Ff A it is doubtful whether a 
successful action could be brought where the investment statement was relied on and the 
prospectus contained the misstatement. Like section 56, the Ff A requires only that the 
prospectus or investment statement contained the misstatement, although it need not be 
specifically relied on. With the absence of provisions incorporating prospectus statements 
into investment statements, and in the absence of clear policy to do so, reliance under the 
Ff A is likely to be limited to the document actually relied on. 
(c) Loss 
Thirdly, the investor must show they suffered loss "by reason" of the untrue statement in 
the prospectus or advertisement. This is typically shown by a decrease in value of the 
security because of the untrue statement. Where, however, the decrease in value can be 
attributed to another factor unconnected to the untrue statement, such as a general 
downturn in the economic conditions, the plaintiff will be unable to show that they have 
suffered the requisite loss needed under section 56. 
2 The Impact of Clause 40 of the First Schedule to the Securities Regulations 
1983 
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As mentioned, the Securities Act employs general disclosure provisions that supplement 
the mandatory requirements imposed under the Act. These general provisions make it 
clear that the detailed disclosure requirements do not provide an exhaustive list of 
information that should be contained in a prospectus. Clause 40 requires the directors of 
an issuer to state in the prospectus that there are no other material matters "other than 
[the] matters set out elsewhere in the registered prospectus". While not specifically 
considering clause 40, the Commerce Commission recently interpreted the phrase 
"material matters" to incorporate the common law concept of materiality and in doing so 
said: 119 
We think that the 'material matters' which are here required to be disclosed cover all 
matters which the Courts have considered to be material at common law, namely, all 
matters which might reasonably affect the judgement of an intending investor under the 
prospectus when making an informed decision on whether or not to invest. 
The Commission was also of the view that if no statement was made on an issue, then it 
doubted that clause 40 could apply and that even if clause 40 was breached by the 
prospectus failing to refer to a material matter, there would still be no untrue statement. 120 
The Court of Appeal disagreed. In R v Baxter121 the Crown charged Baxter with having 
signed a registered prospectus that included an untrue statement. The untrue statement 
Baxter was said to have made was the clause 40 statement, stating there were no other 
material matters. In other words, the claim was essentially a claim as to a material 
omission that did not turn on a positive statement. Blanchard J in holding Baxter liable 
stated that: 122 
119 Securities Commission Report on Inquiry into a Registered Prospectus Issued by Agricola Resources 
Limited Dated 3 June 1986 (Securities Commission, Wellington , 1986) 27 [A gricola Resources]. The 
Commission also took this view in a subsequent report: Securities Commission Report on an Inquiry into 
the Voting Securities of Air New Zealand Ltd (Securities Commission, Wellington, 1991) 41-42. In this 
report it is notable that the Commission referred to the decisions of Muggeridge above n85 , Kisch above 
1186 and Basic Inc v Levinson above n112. 
120 Agricola Resources above 11119, para 15.7.l(a) and (c), and para 15.6.2. 
121 R v Baxter [1998] 3 NZLR 144; (1988) 15 CRNZ 580 (CA) [Baxter]. 
122 Baxter above n121 , NZLR 157; CRNZ 592. 
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It was not necessary for the Crown to show that [Baxter] acted dishonestly, merely that in 
putting his signature to a statement that there were not other material matters, he was 
making an untrue statement. 
Therefore it is clear that if any matters that may reasonably affect the judgement of an 
intending investor have been omitted, although that information need not be decisive in 
that decision, an action under clause 40 may lie. And like the Ff A, under the Securities 
Act there is a need to prove the materiality of the omitted information. Therefore this 
action is similar to, if not the same as, the ' reasonable expectation of disclosure' approach 
under the Ff A. The only differences being therefore, is the absence of defences under the 
Ff A, and the way the different regimes operate. The Securities Act still relies on the 
proving of a positive statement to be false, while non-disclosure under the Ff A must be 
considered to be misleading or deceptive where, in the circumstances, there was a duty to 
speak. 
It is also conceivable in the securities context that the ' reasonable expectation of 
disclosure' approach could be abandoned, or pleaded in addition to, a misleading or 
deceptive clause 40 claim. Should a clause 40 statement be false, this would be in itself 
misleading and deceptive conduct and could supplement a claim for a substantive 
misleading or deceptive omission. However because the substance of each claim relies on 
the proof of a material omission, there would be no actual difference between the causes 
of action. 
Therefore if clause 40 can operate as a general 'catch-all ' provision under the Securities 
Act, like that of the Ff A, from a disclosure point of view it is possible to argue quite 
convincingly that there would be no justification for allowing the Ff A to apply. And 
given the similarity between the two non-disclosure actions, there would be strong 
argument that such overlap is clearly unnecessary. 
39 
3 Who can sue? 
Any person who has subscribed or purchased 1'.!3 securities on the faith of the prospectus 
has the right to bring an action. However under section 6, certain sections, including 
section 56, do not apply to previously allotted securities unless the security was originally 
allotted with a view for it to be offered for sale to the public in New Zealand and the 
security has not previously been offered for sale to the public in ew Zealand. 124 
However assuming the requirements of section 6(2) are satisfied, under section 6(7) the 
subsequent purchaser could have a claim against the original i uer and the subsequent 
holder of the securities. 
4 Who can be sued? 
Under the section 56(1) the following person can be liable: 
• 
• 
• 
The issuer (if that issuer is an individual); 
Every person who signed the prospectus as a director of the is uer or on whose behalf 
the prospectus has been signed; 
Every person who has authorised themselves to be named as a director of the issuer of 
the prospectus; 
Every promoter of the securities. 
It is important to note that unlike other juri dictions, a cause of action will not ari e m 
ew Zealand against a corporation. 125 And , in the context of a promoter, the definition 
expressly excludes those acting solely in their professional capacity. Civil liability is also 
imposed on an expert under section 57 who makes untrue statements. 
123 The Securities Act section 2 defines "subscribe" as including purchasing. 
124 Securities Act, section 6(2) . 
l'.!.5 Section 85A of the Australian Corpo rations Law includes in the definiti on of a person, a body po litic o r 
co rporate, as well as an individual. 
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Thus it is clear that the legislature has considered carefully those who will be civilly 
responsible for breach of the Securities Act. In this respect the potential of the FT A to 
cast a wider liability net may, in the case of securities, undermine the clear objectives of 
the legislature. For example it is clear that the Ff A would apply to previously allotted 
securities, and it is quite likely that the Ff A would allow the defendant issuer to include a 
corporation. Such circumvention of the clear legislative intention would serve as a strong 
argument against the application of the Ff A to the securities market. 
5 Defences 
Under the Securities Act there a number of substantive and personal defences. In the case 
of substantive defences, different statutory standards will apply depending on the capacity 
in which the defendant is sued, and on the part of the prospectus in which the untrue 
statement appears. 
(a) Substantive defences 
Directors, issuers (where that issuer is an individual) and promoters are individually 
responsible for any untrue statement in the prospectus. Where the untrue statement is 
made by an expert, or is contained in any report or valuation by an expert, the director can 
avoid liability by proving: 126 
• 
• 
• 
That the statement fairly represented the expert's statement, or was a correct and fair 
copy of, or extract from , the expert's report or valuation; and 
The defendant had reasonable grounds to believe and did, up to the time of the issue 
of the prospectus, the expert making the statement was competent to make it; and 
That the expert had given consent for the inclusion of the statement. 
126 Securities Act, section 56(3)(d)(i)-(iii). 
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More importantly, if the statement is made anywhere else in the prospectus, the defendant 
can only avoid liability by proving that he had reasonable grounds to believe and did, up 
to the time of the subscription for the securities, believe that the statement was true. 127 
Under the comparable liability prov1s10n for experts, 128 section 57, experts can escape 
liability by proving that they were competent to make the statement complained of, and 
had reasonable grounds to believe and did, up to th_e time of the subscription for the 
securities, believe that the statement was true. 129 This is, of course, only in relation to any 
untrue statement made by the expert, or contained in any report prepared by him. 130 
Therefore it is clear that Parliament intended the preparers of prospectuses to have a 'due 
diligence' defence, 131 and by doing so, created an incentive for prospectus preparers to go 
to reasonable lengths to ensure the statements contained within the prospectus are true. In 
this way, the preparers of prospectuses will afford themselves a defence. Such a defence 
will only be available where the director themselves undertook a due diligence inquiry 
and did not simply rely on the advice of others. This point was made clear in Adams v 
Thrift 132 where the English Court of Appeal noted: 133 
Of course it is not necessary that [a] .. . director should play the part of a lawyer or 
accountant by examining into facts or figures ... But if he will sign a prospectus without 
obtaining or even asking for any information of this kind, it is quite clear that he cannot 
protect himself under [section 56] even though the directors who signed the prospectus 
before him might and did believe the statements contained in it to be true. 
127 Securities Act, section 56(3)(c). 
128 Note that the definition of expert expressly excludes a person acting in their capacity as an auditor. 
129 Securities Act, section 57(3)(c). 
130 Securities Act, section 57(1 ). 
13 1 For more information on the due diligence defence see Hood and Boswell " Due Diligence Reviews for 
Fund-raisings Under the Australian Corporations Law" in Walker, Fisse and Ramsay above n95 , 88; Peter 
Fitzsimons "Prospectuses, Misstatements and the ' Due Diligence ' Defence (Part I)" (2000) 4 Comp & Sec 
LB 48 and Peter Fitzsimons "Prospectuses, Misstatements and the ' Due Diligence ' Defence (Part II)" 
(2000) 6 Comp & Sec LB 73. 
132Adams v Thrift [1915] 2 Ch D 21 [Adams v Thrift]; followed by Bundle v Davies [1932) GLR 379. 
133 Adams v Thrift above n132, 24 per Lord Cozens-Hardy MR. 
42 
Therefore it is clear that strict liability under the Ff A will undermine the due diligence 
incentive of the Securities Act. Not only would market confidence be undermined but in 
order to avoid liability under the Ff A, preparers' would need to go to unreasonable 
lengths to ensure statements contained within the prospectus are true. Even then they 
would not be assured of indemnity. Alternatively, and what would be considerably worse, 
is that no due diligence inquiry whatsoever would be undertaken as the defence afforded 
under the Securities Act would be, in effect, illusory. Undoubtedly such effects are 
obviously undesirable. 
(b) Personal defences 
The personal defences available under the Securities Act largely relate to the withdrawal 
of consent. A named director may avoid liability by proving that he withdrew his consent 
to becoming a director prior to the issue of the prospectus provided he gave written notice 
to the Securities Commission and that he did not authorise the prospectus. 134 Following 
the issue of the prospectus, a director can also avoid liability by proving that the 
prospectus was distributed or registered without his consent and that on becoming aware 
of the distribution or registration, he gave notice to the commission and reasonable notice 
to the public that the prospectus was registered without his consent. 135 On the finding of 
an untrue statement after the distribution of a prospectus, and prior to subscription, the 
director can avoid liability by proving he withdrew his consent to being named in the 
prospectus and notified the Registrar, the Commission, and gave reasonable notice to the 
public of his withdrawaI. 136 
An expert will also be able to escape liability if he withdrew his consent to the inclusion 
of his statement or report in the prospectus prior to the distribution of the prospectus, 137 or 
if he became aware of an untrue statement or omission in the prospectus before the 
134 Securities Act, section 56(2). 
135 Securities Act, section 56(3)(a) 
136 Securities Act, section 56(3)(b ). 
137 Securities Act, section 57(2)(a). 
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securities were subscribed, he withdrew his consent and gave notice to the registrar, the 
Commission, and gave reasonable notice to the public. 138 
Again because the Ff A does not requue intention or knowledge, these defences are 
unlikely to have effect. Such circumvention is clearly undesirable. 
6 Is section 56 effective? 
To date there have been no successful reported civil actions under section 56. Such a 
phenomenon has not been uncommon in Canada 139 and the United Kingdom. 140 In the 
New Zealand context, Fitzsimons141 attributes this to the ease of proving section 58,142 the 
fact that a civil action is of little value if the directors are insolvent, and because the 
individual bringing the action does not have to bear the costs of a criminal action and 
would not be personally liable for a claim for costs. Fitzsimons also notes that because an 
investor can only claim damages "by reason of such untrue statements" it may prove to 
difficult or too small an amount relative to the litigation costs. Undoubtedly part of the 
reason must also lie in the widely held view that actions for material om1ss10ns were 
previously unavailable under the Securities Act. 
This raises the question of whether the system works appropriately because assummg 
untrue statements exist, no investors have received compensation and the only actions 
brought have been criminal. Whether this is due to the predominant use of the Ff A is 
unclear, but it does serve to illustrate the possibility that many deserving plaintiffs may 
not have been indemnified for their losses. Moreover, such a result could provide a strong 
138 Securities Act, section 57(2)(b ). 
139 See J Chapman "Class Proceedings for Prospectus Misrepresentations" (1994) 73 Can Bar Rev 492, 
494. 
140 See A Hofler "Company Securities - Misinformation and Litigation" (1995) 16 The Company Lawyer 
67,71. 
141 Fitzsimons, above n70, 252-257. Fitzsimons suggests that the availability of class actions or the 
introduction of contingency fees could increase the number of civil actions. 
142 This paper will not consider criminal liability under section 58. However, for completeness purposes, 
under section 58 it is unnecessary lo prove that the statement caused any loss, nor is it necessary to prove 
intention (required under section 250 of the Crimes Act 1961). 
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argument for the application of the FTA as an alternate remedy, or conversely, provide 
incentives for possible Jaw reform, maybe similar to that in Australia, to the liability 
provisions of the Securities Act. 
V AUSTRALIAN DEVELOPMENTS 
A Overview 
In 1991 Australia experienced fundamental change in relation to fund-raising with the 
Corporations Law143 coming into force. Reform was driven by the pressures of 
globalisation, 144 the need for the Jaw to keep pace with the business environment and the 
need to avoid costly compliance burdens on Australian businesses from the rigidity and 
complexity of existing laws. The simplification process continued in 1997 with the 
launch of the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP) having the overall 
objective of ensuring that business regulation was consistent with promoting a strong 
vibrant economy and to provide a framework that would assist businesses to change. 
For the purposes of this paper, the most important change was the opting by the 
Australian Government to exclude the application of the TPA from the securities market. 
Other significant changes relating to disclosure and liability include: 145 
• Substituting the "offer to the public" test with some broad prohibitions on offers 
without a prospectus, coupled with express exemptions in cases where the offer was 
essentially private or the offeree could look after itself; 
143 The Corporations Act 1989. 
144 For a detailed analysis of the impacts of globalisation on New Zealand see Gordon Walker and Mark 
Fox "Globalisation: Meanings and Implications" and Andrew Simpson "Securities Regulation for the 
Information Age" in Walker, Fisse and Ramsay above n95 , 3-54. 
145 HA J Ford et al Ford's Principles of Corporations Law (9 ed , Butterworths, Sydney, 1999) para 22.190. 
For more information see Claire Grose " Will the Small Business Fundrai ing Reforms Proposed by CLERP 
Really Make it Easier for SME 's to Raise Capital in Australia?" (1998) 16 Comp & Sec Ll 297; G W Hone 
"Fundraising and Prospectuses - The CLERP Proposals" (1998) 16 Comp & Sec Ll 311 and Sam Cadman 
"Offer Information Statements Under CLERP" (1998) 16 Comp & Sec LJ 394. 
45 
• 
• 
• 
Repealing the detailed content requirements for prospectuses, and substituting a broad 
"reasonable investor" standard of disclosure; 
Replacing detailed pre-vetting with post-registration examination by the Australian 
Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC); and 
Empowering the ASIC to issue a stop order if a prospectus proved to be deficient 
after it had been issued, and requiring the authors of the prospectus to issue a 
supplementary prospectus if there was a significant change of circumstances. 
Further changes were introduced by the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Bill 
1999 in the wake of strong government and business opinion.146 The main elements of the 
new provisions are: 147 
• 
• 
• 
The removal of the existing overlap between the general prohibition on misleading 
conduct (contained within section 995 of the Corporations Law) and the prohibition 
on misleading statements in, or omissions from, a prospectus (contained in section 
728 of the Corporations Law); 
Removing the requirement of materiality when establishing whether an offer 
document is misleading or deceptive in civil proceedings148 and therefore allowing 
recovery for damages where loss can be shown as a result of the misstatement;149 
Giving the issuer of a disclosure document, the directors or proposed directors and the 
underwriters potential liability in relation to the whole document, while others will 
only be liable for statements in the document made by them or based on their 
statements, where they have consented; 150 
146 These reports include: the Task Force Report above n 17; Corporate Law Econom ic Reform Program, 
Proposals for Reform: Paper No 2, Fundraising: Capital Raising Initiatives to Build Enterprise and 
Employment (AGPS, Canberra, 1997); Corporations Law Simplification Program Fune/raising: Trade 
Practices Act, Section 52 and Securities Dealings (AGPS, Canberra, 1995); The Financial System Inquiry 
Final Report (the Wallis Report) (AGPS, Canberra, 1997) and Industry Commission, Information Paper 
Small Business Research Program (AGPS, Canberra , 1997). 
147 Ford above nl45 , para 22.530. 
148 Corporations Law, section 728(1). 
149 Corporations Law, section 729(1). 
15° Corporations Law, section 729. 
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• Removing criminal liability unless the defect in the prospectus is materially adverse 
from the point of view of an investor; 151 
• Extending the liability provisions to a case where a new circumstance will arises since 
the disclosure document was lodged, which would have been required to be disclosed 
if it had arisen before lodgment; 152 
• Allowing a uniform defence to civil and criminal actions upon proof that the person 
has made all inquiries that were reasonable in the circumstances and, after doing so, 
believed on reasonable grounds that the statement was not misleading or deceptive; 153 
• Allowing a defence to civil and criminal actions where the person places reasonable 
reliance on information given by someone other than an employee or agent of the 
person 154 and where a person publicly withdraws their consent to being named in the 
disclosure document. 155 
B The General Disclosure Requirement 
Among many significant changes the Corporations Law replaced the "offer to the public" 
concept existing previously under the Companies Code with a general disclosure 
obligation. Put simply, the "offer to the public" concept required disclosure only when an 
offer was made to the public. This concept was based on the notion that private offers 
need not be regulated because the offeree could make 'face-to-face' inquiries of the 
offeror, and, in any event, the cost of preparation could not be justified. This was 
abandoned in Australia for a number of reasons. First, the test was troublesome in its 
application. It was extraordinary difficult to apply, and there was considerable uncertainty 
as to when a prospectus was needed. Secondly, the test was open to manipulation, 
particularly because of the exception for offers made to persons whose ordinary business 
was to buy or sell securities. An unsophisticated private client of a stockbroker might be 
151 Corporations Law, section 728(3). 
152 Corporations Law, section 728(1) and (3). 
153 Corporations Law, section 731. 
154 Corporations Law, section 733(1). 
155 Corporations Law, section 733(3). 
47 
persuaded to conduct his or her trading activities through a company formed specifically 
for that purpose, and in such case the exemption would be available. 156 
Prospectuses are now required to include all information that a reasonable investor and 
their investors' adviser would expect to find in the prospectus to make an informed 
investment decision. 157 It is intended to ensure that the information presented to investors 
be of sufficient quality to enable them to make an informed assessment of the corporation 
and the investment. Coupled with the adoption of a regulatory post-vetting program, the 
onus was placed squarely on those preparing the prospectus to determine what 
information should be provided, and to comply with the disclosure requirements. Because 
of this, information disclosure has improved and has led to more relevant information 
being disclosed. However initially at least, it has also led to the disclosure of excessive 
amounts of information as issuers were uncertain how to deal with the new disclosure 
regime. 
It has also been suggested that by being directly linked with the reasonable investor 
requirement, the general disclosure test will also be responsive to changes in market 
expectations, practices and products over time. Many also believe that such a test will no 
longer arbitrarily include information that may not assist investors. While this may be 
true, the check.list approach arguably allows for better comparability between investment 
prospectuses due to the standard form disclosure. The checklist also provides greater 
certainty to those who issue prospectuses. 
It is arguable that general disclosure may led to better disclosure where the checklist 
approach includes information that is no longer relevant to the reasonable investor. 
However when compared to disclosure obligations with general "catch-all " provisions in 
addition to the prescribed information, it is clear that although it is possible for more 
information to be disclosed , the quality of the information should be the same. 
156 Ford above n145 , para 22.180. 
157 Corporations Law, section 710. Jn addition, there are also mandatory requirements under section 711. 
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C Reasons to Exclude the TPA 
With the enactment of section 995A of the Corporations Law by the CLERP Act 1999, a 
section 52 cause of action no longer applied to dealing in securities. 158 This allowed a 
uniform defence of due diligence to apply to any person who unintentionally makes a 
misleading or deceptive statement or a material omission in a prospectus. Thus a person 
will not be liable if they prove that they made such inquiries as were reasonable, they 
took reasonable care, and it was reasonable for them to have believed that the prospectus 
was not misleading. 
In order to determine whether New Zealand should follow Australia's initiative, an 
assessment of the Australian developments should be made. If the same considerations 
could apply to the New Zealand securities environment, the argument for the 
abandonment of the FT A would be considerably stronger. 
1 The Fundamental Difference 
The strongest reason against the application of the TPA is that a fundamental difference 
exists in the way the two regimes operate. The Corporations law imposes a positive duty 
of disclosure on those responsible for providing information to the investing public. Such 
an obligation achieves investor protection by ensuring those involved in the preparation 
of information check and test the information with all due diligence before disseminating 
it. Implicit in this approach is that if investors suffer loss because they relied on 
information that was incorrect or incomplete, but those who prepared the information 
158 More accurately, section 995 of the Corporatio ns Law did not apply. This secti on was based on sectio n 
52 of the TPA and has been interpreted and applied s imilarl y. In NRMA above nlO, 552, the Full Federal 
Court of Australia noted that because " the relevant proscription is expressed in identical terms .. . th e issues 
for determination would have been substanti ally th e same". This is because " the app li ca nt should not be 
ab le to avo id an unfavourable construc tio n of sect ion 995 in conn ect ion with a dea ling in securiti es by 
resorting to secti o n 52". Section 52 of the TPA ceased to apply to th e securiti es market o n 1 Jul y 1998 with 
the passing o f section 51AF of the TPA by the Financial Sector Refo rm (Consequential Amendments) Act 
1998. This removed secti on 52 ' s applicat io n to fin ancial services. See above nl 9. 
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exercised due di] igence, the investors have no cause of action. In this way , the law 
focuses on the thoroughness of the process of preparation. 
In contrast, section 52 of the TPA does not impose a duty to disclose information . Rather, 
it sets out a standard of conduct in trade or commerce. In this manner the TPA, like other 
consumer protection law, concentrates on the effect of the information on the consumers 
to whom it has been disseminated. If they suffer loss by another ' s misleading conduct, 
they are thought to be entitled to recover regardless of whether the person who supplied 
the information caused the mistake, or had exercised due diligence to avoid the mistake 
which had occurred. 
Given the obligations which the Corporations Law imposes on those involved with 
fundraising and takeovers to disclose all rel evant information, defences play an important 
role. They ensure an appropriate balance is struck between the rights of investors and the 
obligations of business. This carefully chosen balance is undermined if investors can 
succeed in an action under the TP A where defences are not available, in circumstances 
where defences exist under the Corporations Law .159 
2 A ssumption of Risk 
By its very nature and unlike other consumer markets, the securities market is 
speculative. In this context, no degree of legislative intervention should insulate the 
investor from the realities of the business environment or from the competency of 
corporate management. 160 It is not possible, nor should it be possible, for legislation to 
prevent the public from making bad investment decisions. Thi risk is borne by the 
159 Corporatio ns Law Sim plifica tio n Progra m Fundraising: Trade Practices Act, Sect ion 52 and Securities 
Dealings (A GPS, Canberra , 1995), 19. 
160 The Report of the Ministerial Group on Securities Law Reform (August 1991) (the ' Roche Report') 
60 ,579 noted th at " regul a tion cannot and should not attempt to relieve in vesto rs [ of the need to assess th e 
ri sk o f an investment] . Regula tio n cannot remove the poss ibility of losses. It should not be the purpose of 
regul ation to improve the outcomes fo r investors genera lly by ' second guessing' the market; regul at ion 
may, ove r time, inhibit desirable innova tio n w hich may reduce the choices avai lable and thereby harm 
investo rs". 
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investor and the investor alone. The Government should not be expected to hold the 
investor 's hand, but rather to ensure the adequate disclosure of the risks so that rational 
investment decisions can be made. This is done by virtue of the securities legislation. 
Moreover, the investor should not be deprived of the right to desire high returns, albeit 
with the assumption of higher risk. Therefore, although the supply of information 
required under the securities regulation may prevent some people from putting money 
into suspect schemes, it will do nothing to prevent those who do so, or for those who 
suffer losses as a result of collapse, mismanagement or market failure. The investor 
accepts these risks. 
It is also important to add that the imposition of strict liability will not reduce the risk 
inherent in the securities market. The risk that information exists which is material to an 
investment decision, but which no degree of care or inquiry will uncover, will always be 
present and must be accepted by the investor. 
3 The Existing System is Adequate 
Because the current regulatory approach to fundraising ensures the full disclosure of 
information to investors by requiring a positive disclosure obligation, specifying the 
information required, and imposing liability on those responsible to compensate investors 
who have suffered loss, many would regard this as sufficient. Furthermore, there are 
relatively few instances where a different result would be achieved in an action under the 
Corporations Law compared to one under the TPA. This would only happen in a damages 
action where loss has been suffered as a result of misleading or deceptive conduct of a 
kind that could not be discovered by making reasonable inquiries. In that case an action 
would succeed in an action under section 52 but not under the Corporations Law. This 
narrow window of opportunity given to plaintiffs is, in the context of the existence of a 
tailor-made securities regime, unjustified and inappropriate. 
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Without the application of the TPA investors will continue to have the benefit of full 
disclosure coupled with a very strong liability regime which, in effect, requires those 
involved in fundraising to actively search for relevant information and to fully disclose it 
in a manner which is not false or misleading. This regime is generally regarded as being 
as rigorous as any in comparable overseas jurisdictions. 
4 Efficiency 
There are several economic justifications for excluding the operation of the TP A. Firstly, 
the overlap of the two regimes creates uncertainty which is detrimental to the efficient 
operation of the capital market. This uncertainty undermines the market confidence and 
serves to inhibit capital raising, discourage new enterprise and deter innovation. 
Secondly, the justification for the imposition of strict liability is unwarranted in the 
securities context. This is because the rationale for imposing strict liability is that, by 
imposing the cost of damage on the person who bears the least cost of preventing or 
minimising the loss, the possibility of damage is minimised to society. But in the 
securities market, excessive liability for those involved will, despite all reasonable 
precautions, raise the costs of fundraising inducing fundraisers to take precautions beyond 
what is reasonable. Even then they may nonetheless find themselves liable under the 
TP A. Thus while the person who has the least cost of preventing the loss is undoubtedly 
the issuer, it would be inefficient to require beyond what is reasonable, and even then , 
still impose liability. 
Thirdly, it would be, because of the informational asymmetry gap that exists between the 
issuer and investors, economically more efficient for the fundraiser, rather than numerous 
investors, to undertake inquiries and disclose details about its own business. By imposing 
strict liability many fundraisers may neglect the need to do so, and in effect, place the 
burden on those investors who require the information to seek it themselves. 
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Fourthly, strict liability will not shift the loss involved from the investor to the 
corporation. This is because an investor who successfully sues a corporation of which 
they are a member, in relation to loss suffered from a deficient prospectus, will in turn 
suffer Joss by the reduction in the value of the corporation. Similarly, any additional strict 
liability compliance costs will inevitably flow to the investor, irrespective of whether they 
lead to any additional benefit in the form of better disclosure. In this regard, in light of the 
uncertain benefit received, if at all, many investors may prefer to assume the risk of 
imperfect information rather than incur the costs of the efforts to remove it. 
Fifthly, strict liability would lead to less efficient disclosure in prospectuses. Because of 
the ever-present threat of strict liability, issuers may prefer to omit relevant information 
rather than risk making statements that are misleading. Furthermore, many may not 
engage in such a process at all and would distance themselves from the process in order 
to avoid liability. It is clear that these factors would lead to inefficient disclosure in 
prospectuses and would undermine the principles and objectives embodied within the 
securities legislation. 
5 International Comparability and Consistency 
Removing the application of the TPA would allow Australian Jaw to be consistent with 
the approach adopted by other jurisdictions, such as England, the United States and 
Canada. As is evidently clear, these comparable jurisdictions do not allow a general 
misleading and deceptive provision to apply in the securities market context. 16 1 
6 The Difference in Enforcement Powers 
Under the Corporations Law prospectuses are required to be lodged with the ASIC before 
they are issued to potential investors. While the Commission does not engage in detailed 
pre-vetting, many of its examinations result in alterations prior to investors are exposed to 
risk. In fact , in the first year of post-vetting 14% of prospectuses examined required 
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remedial action. 162 In addition, the ASIC has the power to issue administrative 'stop 
orders' in relation to prospectuses which do not meet the disclosure requirements. This 
enables the ASIC to act quickly before investors sustain losses. 
Unless an injunction is sought through the courts, under the TP A loss must be suffered 
before the Act can be invoked. Such delay could allow losses to be sustained by 
investors. This difference in administrative powers, and hence the clear legislative intent, 
has often been cited as a strong reason to exclude the ACCC from the securities market, 
and with it, the application of the TPA. 
D The Argument for the Retention of the TPA 
Of those who were opposed to the exclusion of the TPA, the strongest was from the 
ACCC. The following arguments are essentially built from those advocated by the 
consumer protection agencies such as the ACCC. 
1 Floodgates 
The TPA is economy-wide consumer protection legislation setting minimum standards of 
business for all sectors of the economy. Any exemptions for particular industries or 
sectors of the economy will inevitably harm the reach and effect of the legislation. This is 
because many groups would inevitably seek exemptions. Once a precedent is in place for 
one sector, this will be hard to deny to others. In addition, any exemptions granted will 
distort the clear message of what is and what is not acceptable conduct. This will lead to 
complicating the educational task of the ACCC. 
The case for different treatment for the securities market is based on the special features 
of the Corporations Law regime for fundraising and takeovers. In this regard the 
'floodgates' argument ignores the merits of the proposal in relation to the Corporations 
161 See Appendix One for a summary of these international laws. 
162 ASJC Bulletin Releases (CCH Australia, Sydney) para 158,213. 
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law. The existing legislation, by imposing positive disclosure obligations and providing 
due care defences, accommodates for the inherently uncertain securities market. By its 
very nature consumer legislation does not focus on dealing with forward-looking matters 
which involve as many complexities as the prospects of a trading enterprise. Therefore to 
reject the proposal to exclude the TPA based on a 'floodgates' argument does not 
consider the particular characteristics of the securities market in general or the purpose of 
the existing legislation. And thus in avoiding to do so, negates the compelling force in the 
submission. 
2 Reduction in Consumer Protection 
It is clear that the removal of strict liability will diminish investor protection. Protection 
will not be afforded where imperfect information is provided and all reasonable care has 
been taken. Because of this it is feared that many unsophisticated investors will be 
exposed to potential losses. 
Such a paternalistic attitude to an inherently uncertain market seems misplaced. Investors 
must accept the risks of imperfect information. For, as this paper has already mentioned, 
it is not the role of the Jaw to hold the investors' hand, but rather to ensure that all 
reasonable precautions are taken to enable informed investment decisions. Should the 
TPA apply liability would be imposed even when prospectus preparers have engaged in 
unreasonable measures to ensure the accuracy of the included statements. Even then, the 
risk that the information is imperfect would still be present. To place an unreasonable 
burden on those preparing the prospectus seems to ignore the inherent uncertainty in the 
marketplace. It would also seem unjust to require beyond that which is reasonable when it 
is unlikely that the information provided will improve. 
3 Who Should Bear the Risk? 
The ACCC argued that by excluding the application of the TPA this would have the 
effect of redistributing the risk towards investors. It would be wrong, not to mention 
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economically inefficient, that investors rather than issuers bear the costs of mistakes in 
prospectuses. This is because those who issue prospectuses are in the best position to 
check the accuracy of the information supplied to investors, and in this regard, they 
should be held responsible for their errors. 
The ACCC also submitted that strict liability encourages suppliers of investment products 
to ensure the information provided is accurate. With the removal of strict liability, this 
may encourage higher risk ventures to enter the market as they will be unable or 
unwilling to ensure the accuracy of the information provided. 
This criticisms are flawed. While it is true that an informational imbalance exists between 
the issuer and the investor, it would be uneconomical to require the issuer to go beyond 
that which is reasonable to ensure the accuracy of the statements provided. Furthermore, 
because the securities market is speculative, the risk of imperfect information is ever 
present. Even when the most exhaustive enquiries are made the possibility that 
information has not been uncovered is still at hand. 
Secondly, the ACCC seems to deny the right of investors to invest in riskier, and hence 
more rewarding, ventures. Any encouragement of these enterprises to enter the market 
should be endorsed, albeit with the knowledge that the law requires mandatory 
disclosures of the associated risks involved. Such disclosure, together with due care 
defences, still provides incentives for market participants to ensure the accuracy of the 
information provided. This has not been removed with the exclusion of the TPA. 
E Application to the New Zealand Context 
The arguments against the application of the TPA are very compelling. With the 
exception of the difference in administrative powers, these reasons are equally valid in 
the New Zealand context. 
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There is another reason that could be cited for the exclusion of the Fr A. It is embodied 
with the Latin phrase generalia specialibus non derogant (generalities do not derogate 
from particular provisions). For as was made clear in Barker v Edger: 163 
When the legislature has given its attention to a separate subject, and made provision for 
it, the presumption is that a subsequent general enactment is not intended to interfere with 
the special provision unless it manifests that intention very clearly. Each enactment must 
be construed according to its own subject matter and its own terms. 
Accordingly on this authority it would seem clear that the general provisions of the Fr A 
should not apply to the specific tailor-made regime under the Securities Act. And, in the 
absence of a deficient securities regime in New Zealand, there is strong argument for the 
exclusion of the Fr A. 
VI CONCLUSION 
When the mandatory disclosure requirements of the Securities Act are coupled with the 
obligation not to mislead or deceive under the Fr A, the requirements on those who issue 
prospectuses seem to be rather onerous. Information that is compulsorily required, and 
that which is not, must not be, in all the circumstances, misleading or deceptive. At first 
glance this appears to be beyond that which is required under the Securities Act. However 
after further consideration, it is clear that material omissions are dealt with in a similar 
way under clause 40 of the First Schedule of the Securities Regulations 1983. This clause 
requires the directors of an issuer to state in the prospectus that there are no other material 
matters "other than [the] matters set out elsewhere in the registered prospectus". In this 
way while still reliant on the proving of a positive statement to be false, the mere 
omission of a material matter can be considered an untrue statement under the Securities 
Act. Therefore following logically, from a disclosure point of view the application of the 
Fr A has been made redundant and need no longer apply. 
163 Barker v Edger (1898) NZPCC 422, 427. In Marac Life Insurance v CIR (1986) 1 NZLR 694, 702, 
Cooke J, as he then was, noted that "general provisions do not override special ones". 
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From a liability perspective it has been shown that with the absence of defences under the 
FT A, this, in the securities context, is unfair and inappropriate. For while it is 
undoubtedly right that the Jaw should attach liability on those responsible for prospectus 
misstatements where they are at fault, but where they are not, or have taken all due care, 
imposing liability would clearly be unjust. Moreover because the securities market is 
inherently uncertain and speculative, the risk of imperfect information will always be 
present, and may exist regardless of any exhaustive attempts by issuers to uncover the 
relevant information. In this regard, imposing liability despite all due care taken, would 
amount to holding fundraisers liable for the inherent risk and imperfect information that 
exists in the securities market. This risk is accepted by the investor. It would also 
significantly increase the cost of fund-raising and would serve to dampen the overall 
market confidence. 
Therefore this paper concludes that the "cancerous" Fair Trading Act should not be 
allowed to apply to the New Zealand securities market. The FTA provides an unnecessary 
overlap to the existing securities regime, and undermines the carefully chosen balance 
between the rights of investors and the obligations of business. The Australian initiative 
should be followed to allow the securities industry to function without restraint. This will 
increase public confidence and in turn will permit the securities market to become a more 
effective and efficient part of the economy, therefore allowing the general public to 
benefit. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
A International Disclosure Laws 
1 England 
Following the enactment of the Directors ' Liability Act 1890 England recognised the 
importance of imposing liability for prospectus misstatements. Incorporated into 
subsequent Companies Acts any disclosure obligations have been accompanied with 
associated due care defences. 164 In addition, the Code on Takeovers and Mergers 
encourages full disclosure of material information in the making of takeover offers. For 
any inadequate disclosure the Takeovers Panel has the ability to administer disciplinary 
proceedings. No general prohibition against misleading or deceptive conduct exists in 
United Kingdom law. The above statutes, the Misrepresentation Act 1967, and the 
common law provide these remedies. 165 
2 United States 
Civil liability and associated defences in relation to fundraising are governed in the 
United States of America by the Securities Act 1933. A plaintiff may also have a claim 
under section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 1934 and Securities Exchange 
Commission Rule lOb-5 although in both cases intention must be proven. In addition, 
under Federal law 'tender offers ' are regulated by the Securities Exchange Act, as 
amended by the Williams Act 1968. The Williams Act was designed to protect investors 
through mandatory disclosure. Material misstatement or omissions in disclosure 
164 In England offerings of listed and unlisted securities are subject to different statutory regimes. The 
Financial Services Act 1986 and the London Stock Exchange Listing Rules regu lates listed securities while 
unlisted securities are regulated by the Public Offers of Securities Regulations 1995 and the Companies Act 
1995. Due diligence defences are contained within sections 150 and 151 of the Financial Services Act 1986 
for listed securities and in Regulations 14 and 15 of the Public Offers of Securities Regulations 1995 for 
unlisted securities. 
165 These include rescission , actions for damages for the tort of decei t, damages for negligent 
representation, and damages for breach of contract. 
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documents give rise to an action for damages for loss suffered where the plaintiff proves 
reliance on the misstatement or omission. A defence of good faith and absence of 
knowledge that the statement was false or misleading is provided. 
Section 5(1)(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act 1914 provides a similar provision 
to section 52 of the TP A. 166 This provision is mirrored by most states providing for 
liability damages for unfair and deceptive practices. The general rule is that state 
consumer legislation does not cover securities fraud 167 because either securities 
transactions are outside the scope of a 'consumer transaction ' or because securities are 
regulated under another act or agency .168 
3 Canada 
In Canada most provinces have legislation based on the American Securities Act 1933. 
Section 52(l)(a) of the Federal Competition Act makes it an offence to make a 
representation to the public that is false or misleading in a material aspect for the purpose 
of promoting the supply or use of a product or for the purpose of promoting any business 
interest. Both civil and criminal liability are subjected to a defence of reasonable 
precautions and the exercise of due diligence. At State level , the Ontario Business 
Practices Act, generally regarded as the leading province in securities regulation, 
expressly excludes securities from the definition of goods for false or misleading conduct. 
166 Section 5(1)(a) provides that "unfa ir methods of competition in o r affecting commerce, and unfair o r 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful" . 167 Robertson v White 633 F Supp 954 (1 986). 
168 For example in A lla is v Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette 532 F Supp 749 (1982) securiti es fraud was held 
to be outside the scope of the Texan Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Pro tecti on Act because 
shares were outside the definiti on of goods. Furthermore the Court held that the consumer law did no t 
apply because it would circumvent the Texas Blue Sky Law (securiti es disclosure law) which had due 
diligence defences. 
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